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Most state supreme court justices have no choice but to take into
account “The Will of the People.” In thirty-eight states, justices stand
for reelection; in eighteen states, voters can overturn state supreme
court decisions by amending their constitutions through the initiative
process; many state supreme courts cannot steer away from contro1
versy by refusing to hear politically charged cases. But how does
democratic accountability influence state court decision making? On
the one hand, state justices subject to election almost certainly take
into account the risk of electoral defeat. At the same time, these justices must also reach out to individuals whose interests may not align
with the popular will, most notably campaign contributors.
In the pages that follow, we will advance a preliminary, commonsense argument about the role of public opinion in state supreme
court decision making. First, we will argue that public opinion is far
more salient to justices subject to contested judicial elections than to
justices who are more politically insulated. For this very reason, pathbreaking state courts—state courts that take the lead in extending
2
rights and defining the bounds of the law —are subject to fewer
democratic controls than state courts that steer away from political
controversy. Second, the mass public is generally uninterested in politics (especially state supreme court decision making) and, consequently, there are a limited number of high-salience issues in which
the justices have strong incentive to take voter backlash into account.
Third (and correspondingly), state justices—especially those subject
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See Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward a StateCentered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1639–53 (2010)
(discussing the various aspects of state constitutions and state courts that engender a
greater responsiveness to public opinion).
See, e.g., id. at 1674–85 (discussing path-breaking state supreme courts in the area of gay
marriage and specifically noting that the state supreme courts that have ruled on the issue and extended marriage to homosexual couples have fewer democratic checks).
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to contested elections—are likely to take into account the views of
campaign contributors and interest groups that run television ads.
In making these points, we do not mean to suggest that state justices are not principally interested in advancing their vision of good
legal policy. Moreover, state justices may also be attentive to their
reputation with state officials, elites (journalists and academics), and
the mass public. As it turns out, the structure of state judicial systems
figures prominently in this calculation. Justices who run in contested
elections, like other politicians, personally value their reputation with
the mass public much more than justices who sit on politically insu3
lated courts.
Our essay will be divided into three parts. Part I will provide a
quick tour of the ways in which state judicial systems are subject to
one or another form of democratic control. Part I will also highlight
the increasing importance of judicial elections to state supreme court
justices. Part II will discuss how state justices are well positioned to
take political consequences into account and, more generally, how
the values and aspirations of state supreme court justices may be tied
to the characteristics of their judicial system. Parts I and II, moreover, will lay out the basic facts which back up our claim that the salience of public opinion is tied both to differences in state judicial
systems and to the electoral significance of a particular issue. Part III
will discuss the evidence we have gathered about the influence of
public opinion and campaign contributions on state supreme court
decision making. Overall, the evidence backs up our central claims,
including our claim that politically insulated state supreme courts are
likely to play a path-breaking role on highly charged political controversies.
Before turning to Part I, two observations: one about the importance of our project and one about the limits of the empirical evidence that backs up our conclusions. First, the relationship between
public opinion and state supreme court decision making is tremend4
ously important. State supreme courts have eclipsed the U.S. Supreme Court in shaping the meaning of constitutional values. State
supreme courts decide around 2,000 constitutional law cases each
3

4

For an analogous argument (from which we will draw), see generally Lawrence Baum &
Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J.
1515 (2010) (arguing that justices on politically insulated courts, like the U.S. Supreme
Court, are especially interested in their reputation among one or another elite audience).
Of course, the relationship between public opinion and U.S. Supreme Court decision
making is tremendously important. Witness, for example, the very fine papers published
in this Symposium and Barry Friedman’s excellent book, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE
(2009).
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year; the U.S. Supreme Court decides around thirty. More significantly, state supreme courts sometimes interpret their constitutions
to provide protections above the floor set by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Examples include abortion, gay rights, takings, religious liberty, and a
6
host of criminal procedure protections. Second, as we will explain in
Part III, there is very little available information about the relationship between public opinion and state supreme court decision making. Notwithstanding the profound and ever-growing influence of
state supreme courts, their decision making receives scant attention
7
from journalists and legal academics. For example, there is limited
newspaper coverage of state court decisions and next to no opinion
poll data on voter attitudes towards state supreme court decisions.
Consequently, the analysis in this essay should be seen for what it is—
a preliminary attempt to discuss the relationship between state supreme court decision making and public opinion.
I. DEMOCRATIC CHECKS ON STATE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
State supreme courts are far more vulnerable to political influ8
ence than are federal courts. With the exception of Rhode Island,
state justices do not have life tenure (although justices in Massachusetts and New Hampshire serve until seventy and are not subject to
9
reelection or reappointment). Many state supreme courts cannot
use standing to sue, certiorari denials, or other “passive virtues” to extricate themselves from politically controversial cases; indeed, the
constitutions or statutes of eleven states authorize state lawmakers or
10
governors to seek advisory opinions from state supreme courts. Fi5
6
7

8
9
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Devins, supra note 1, at 1635.
See id. at 1636.
For this very reason, the Conference of State Chief Justices has called for law schools to
teach courses in state constitutional law and embraced a State Supreme Court Initiative
designed to encourage news coverage and academic commentary of state supreme court
decision-making. Conference of Chief Justices Resolution 1 (Feb. 4, 2010) (on file with
author). Likewise, recognizing real limits in available data on state judicial elections,
Washington University in St. Louis is sponsoring the State Judicial Election Initiative. The
Judicial Elections Data Initiative, WASH. UNIV. ST. LOUIS, http://jedi.wustl.edu/.
See infra notes 69–78 and accompanying text.
In New Jersey, state justices are subject to gubernatorial reappointment but then serve
until they are seventy. Before 2010, reappointment was fairly routine. In May 2010, however, Governor Christopher Christie refused to reappoint a sitting Justice so that he could
appoint someone “who he said would show the restraint that was missing from the court.”
Richard Perez-Pena, Christie, Shunning Precedent, Drops Justice from Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2010, at A22.
See generally Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001) (discussing the differences that exist between
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nally, state constitutions are far easier to amend than the Federal
Constitution, with some state constitutions authorizing constitutional
amendment by citizen initiative.
Differences between state constitutional systems and the federal
system are so dramatic that the models political scientists employ to
discuss the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and the
American people have no application to democratically accountable
state systems. Consider, for example, the argument that Supreme
Court Justices simply vote their policy preferences and need not take
into account public or lawmaker backlash. Political scientists who
make this argument point to life tenure, docket control, and the
near-impossibility of amending the Constitution to override a Court
11
ruling. Most state supreme court justices are without any of these
protections and, consequently, state justices are apt to take backlash
risks into account.
At the same time, there are dramatic differences among state
courts. There is a wide range of appointment and retention schemes,
mechanisms for amending state constitutions are highly varied, and
docket control is dramatically different among the states. In other
words, some state justices are especially vulnerable to democratic
checks and others are protected from most types of political retaliation.
The balance of this Part will provide a quick tour of how state systems vary from each other, with particular emphasis on judicial elec12
tions. The ramifications of all this will be considered at the end of
the Part. In particular, we will explain why democratically accountable state justices have reason to take voter backlash into account on
high-salience issues, why these same justices also need to reach out to
campaign contributors, and why politically insulated justices can nevertheless pursue significant social change through expansive interpretations of state constitutional provisions.

11

12

state courts that “draw heavily from federal justiciability principles” and those that “diverge from Article III doctrine by offering advisory opinions, resolving moot disputes, and
deciding political questions”).
See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED 92–93 (2002) (“The Supreme Court’s rules and structures . . . give lifetenured justices enormous latitude to reach decisions based on their personal policy preferences.”).
Some of the discussion in this Part is drawn from Devins, supra note 1, at 1640–52 (providing an overview of how states revise their constitutions, select and retain judges, and
decide what stays on the docket).
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A. State Constitutions and Their Amendability
The first key feature that likely influences state supreme court accountability is the state constitution. State constitutions range in size
from 8,000 words (similar to the size of the U.S. Constitution) to
13
14
200,000 words. The states have had 145 constitutions, and the pro15
cedures for amending the states’ constitutions vary. All told, the fif16
ty state constitutions have been amended more than 7,400 times. In

13
14

15

16

Paul Brace & Kellie Sims Butler, New Perspectives for the Comparative Study of the Judiciary:
The State Supreme Court Project, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 243, 244 (2001).
See Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 888 (1999). Louisiana has had the most constitutions in its history as a state, with a total of eleven. JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE
CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 27 (2005). Georgia
has had ten constitutions, South Carolina, seven, and Alabama, Florida, and Virginia have
each had six. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF STATES 12 tbl.1.1 (2009).
For example, twelve states require consideration of legislature-proposed constitutional
amendments in two, separate sessions. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14,
at 14–15 tbl.1.2 (Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin). Another three states
require some type of supermajority vote in one session or a majority vote in two successive
legislative sessions (Connecticut, Hawaii, New Jersey). Id. In order to get an amendment
on the ballot in Connecticut, it must get a three-fourths vote in each house of the legislature in one session or a majority vote in each house in two sessions between which an
election has intervened. Id. Hawaii requires a two-thirds vote in each house in one session or a majority vote in each house in two sessions. Id. New Jersey requires three-fifths
of all members of each house at one session or a majority of all members of each house
for two successive sessions. Id. When the constitutional amendment is voted on in the
legislative sessions, seventeen states require only a majority vote of legislators for the
amendment to be sent for ratification (Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin), nine states require a threefifths vote (Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, and Ohio), and eighteen states require a two-thirds vote (Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming).
Id.
The following states have slightly different requirements: Oregon (majority vote to
amend the constitution and two-thirds vote to revise it), South Carolina (two-thirds majority of members of each house for first passage, and majority of members of each house
after popular ratification), Tennessee (majority of members elected to both houses for
first passage, and two-thirds of members elected to both houses for second passage), and
Vermont (two-thirds vote in the state Senate, majority vote in the state House for first
passage, then a majority of both houses for second passage, but as of 1974, amendments
may be submitted only every four years). Id. When the amendments go for voter ratification, the vast majority of states simply require a majority vote of the electorate to pass the
amendment. Id.
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at 12 tbl.1.1. Topping the list, Alabama’s
constitution has been amended more than 800 times. Id. As another example, California’s constitution has been amended 518 times as of Jan. 1, 2009. Id.; see also GARDNER,
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comparison, “[o]f more than 5,000 proposed amendments to the
U.S. Constitution, only seventeen have been approved since the Bill
of Rights and only three amendments explicitly overruled decisions
17
of the U.S. Supreme Court.”
Notably, in eighteen states, voters can make use of an initiative
18
process to amend their state’s constitution. From 1898 to 1995, voters in seventeen states considered 732 constitutional amendment in19
itiatives, approving 223 of them. Of the 223 constitutional amendment measures passed before 1995, twenty-one were ratified in the
1970s, rising to thirty-three in the 1980s, and rising even further to
20
fourty-two in the period from 1991 to 1995. Since the 1970s, “citizens have used the initiative process more frequently and across a
21
greater number of states than at any other time.” Initiative use increased four-fold during this period; in the 1950s and 1960s, an average of four initiatives were passed each year; in the 1990s and 2000s,
22
an average of seventeen initiatives have been enacted each year.
Voter initiatives have been used to create law on a broad range of
topics including education, the environment, government reform,
23
health, and family law.
B. Docket Control
Docket control also likely influences state supreme court accountability to the voting public and campaign contributors. The U.S.
Supreme Court has virtually total discretion in the cases it hears. This
is not so for most state supreme courts. Six states have virtually no
control over their dockets, six others have near total control, and the

17

18

19
20
21
22
23

supra note 14, at 27 (noting that the South Carolina and Texas constitutions have been
amended more than 400 times each).
Neal Devins, Same-Sex Marriage and the New Judicial Federalism: Why State Courts Should Not
Consider Out-of-State Backlash in NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUAL
ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS 81(James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi eds., 2010).
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at 16 tbl.1.3. State practices vary considerably. Some states have subject matter restrictions and supermajority voting requirements
along with other procedural requirements that restrict the use of the initiative process.
KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 36–37 (2009). There is also
significant variation among direct-democracy states concerning the procedures to get an
initiative on the ballot. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at 16 tbl.1.3.
See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 235 (4th
ed. 2006).
See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 19, at 235.
MILLER, supra note 18, at 46.
Id. at 42 fig.2.1.
MILLER, supra note 18, at 55–65.
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remaining states span the space in between the two extremes. For
example, most medium-sized and larger states have significant (but
not plenary) control over which cases they will hear, while supreme
courts in states without intermediate appellate courts have no choice
25
but to hear appeals. Several states also require their supreme courts
26
to hear all constitutional challenges to state law, and in ten states,
the state supreme court may, and in certain circumstances must, give
advisory opinions—a function completely forbidden for federal
27
courts. State courts, moreover, frequently entertain “disputes between state or local officials when federal courts would dismiss com28
parable cases for lack of standing or ripeness.”
These and other limits on docket control mean that some state
courts cannot make use of the “passive virtues” (certiorari denials,
findings of no jurisdiction) to extricate themselves from politically
29
complex cases. Initiatives, for example, are often subject to preelection review by the state courts, in some cases due to mandatory
requirements of the state’s initiative process, and in other cases due
30
to opponent challenges. Pre-election reviews mainly focus on procedural sufficiency, such as the number of required signatures, the
31
title of the initiative, and its summary. Pre-election substantive challenges are significantly fewer, but “[i]n Arkansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, and Utah, courts will consider facial constitutional challenges to initiatives before the election, and, in
Florida, the state constitution mandates this form of pre-election re32
view.”

24

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND ET AL., COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATISTICS 16–67 (2007), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_research/CSP/
2007_files/State%20Court%20Caseload%20Statistics%202007.pdf (providing graphical
charts of each state’s court structure).
Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV. 961, 984–85
(1978).
See Devins, supra note 1, at 1650 (discussing state court practices and same-sex marriage
litigation).
Brace & Butler, supra note 13, at 248 tbl.1.
Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in Governance: Vive La Différence!, 46 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1273, 1275 (2005) (internal quotations omitted).
For the classic defense of the “passive virtues,” see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
MILLER, supra note 18, at 98–99.
Id. at 99.
Id.
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C. Judicial Selection and Retention
State supreme court justices are selected and retained through varying methods that put the justices in thirty-nine states before voters
33
in partisan, non-partisan, and retention elections. In total, 89% of
state supreme court justices face voters—“43 [%] face retention elections, 20[%] face nonpartisan elections, and 26[%] face partisan
34
elections.”
Although there are numerous ways to categorize the method of
35
selection and retention for state supreme court justices, we have organized states into four groups: partisan election, nonpartisan elec36
tion, merit plan, and gubernatorial/legislative appointment.
In
states with gubernatorial or legislative appointment, the governor or
legislature selects the justice, usually from a list of names provided by
a nominating committee. Non-partisan elections place judges on the
ballot without a party label, whereas partisan elections require judges
to run under a party label. In merit plan states, judges are appointed
by a merit selection board and face retention elections in which there
are no opposing candidates; voters are simply asked to vote “yes” or
37
“no” on whether to retain the judge. Table 1, below, lists the initial
33
34
35

36

37

David Rottman, Judicial Elections in 2008, in COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at
290.
Id.
Id. (claiming that due to the slight variations among the states’ selection and retention
systems, there are sixteen distinct selection/retention schemes). Most sources will group
the states more generally into four or five schemes.
See infra Table 1. Table 2, infra, is grouped into five categories: partisan election, nonpartisan election, merit plan, gubernatorial/legislative appointment, and serve to age seventy/life. The gubernatorial/legislative appointment category from Table 1 is divided
into two categories for Table 2: those states that require reappointment by governor or
legislature and those for which once state supreme court justices are initially selected,
they serve until age 70 or life terms, more akin to the federal bench. Also, merit plan in
Table 1 becomes retention election in Table 2, as merit plan states use retention elections
for reappointment of their judges. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
Rottman, supra note 33, at 290. Under the Missouri Plan, or merit selection, judges were
selected by a judicial committee who evaluated the candidates and passed on names to
the governor to choose an appointment. See Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the
Social Scientific Literature, 106 DICK. L. REV. 729, 729 (2002). After serving a short period
of time (almost like a probation period), the appointed judge’s name was placed on the
election ballot in which voters were asked to vote “yes” or “no” on whether to retain the
judge. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 139 (2009). No other person ran
against the judge, and the judge did not run under any partisan affiliation. Reddick, supra at 729. If voters voted to retain the judge, the judge served a full term on the bench.
Rottman, supra note 33, at 294–95 tbl.5.1. At the end of the term, the judge again faced a
retention election. If approved, he or she served another term, but if not retained, the
process started over again—the judicial committee would form and suggest candidates
for the governor to appoint. Current variations on the Missouri Plan model are numerous.

Dec. 2010]

PUBLIC OPINION AND STATE SUPREME COURTS

463

selection method for each state’s supreme court justices. Table 2
provides a list of retention methods.

Partisan
Election
Alabama
Illinois
Louisiana
Pennsylvania
Texas
West Virginia

TABLE 1:
INITIAL SELECTION METHOD
Non-partisan
Merit Plan
Election
Arkansas
Georgia
Idaho
Kentucky
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montana
Nevada
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
Washington
Wisconsin

Alaska
Arizona
Colorado
Florida
Hawaii
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Maryland
Missouri
Nebraska
Oklahoma
South
Dakota
Utah
Wyoming

Governor /
Legislature
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Maine
Massachusetts
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Vermont
Virginia
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TABLE 2:
RETENTION METHOD

Partisan
Election

Non-partisan
Election

Retention
Election

Governor/
Legislature

Serve to
Age 70 or
Life

Alabama
Louisiana
Texas
West
Virginia

Arkansas
Georgia
Idaho
Kentucky
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montana
Nevada
North
Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
Washington
Wisconsin

Alaska
Arizona
California
Colorado
Florida
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Maryland
Missouri
Nebraska
New
Mexico
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South
Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
Wyoming

Connecticut
Delaware
Hawaii
Maine
New York
South
Carolina
Vermont
Virginia

Massachusetts
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
Rhode
Island

Before the late 1980s, judicial elections were seen as “‘low key affairs, conducted with civility and dignity,’ which were ‘as exciting as a
38
game of checkers. . . . [p]layed by mail.’” Today, judicial elections
39
are more contested and competitive than ever, and money is playing

38

39

Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1589, 1602 (2009)
(alteration in original) (quoting Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1079 (2007)).
See Brace & Butler, supra note 13, at 244 (“[J]udicial elections are more competitive than
commonly believed.”).
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40

an increasing role. Data shows that while only 33% of nonpartisan
elections were contested in 1988, by 2000, 75% of nonpartisan elec41
tions were contested. Similarly, 74% of partisan elections were con42
tested in 1988, but by 2000, that number had risen to 95%. In contested incumbent partisan and nonpartisan elections, incumbent
judges seeking reelection have an 8.3% chance of losing, and an incumbent in a partisan election has a substantially higher chance of
43
losing than an incumbent in a nonpartisan election. In 2000, in44
cumbents in partisan elections were defeated in 45.5% of elections.
This rate of defeat is much higher than for incumbents running for
45
reelection to the U.S. House, U.S. Senate, and state governorships.
In comparison to contested elections, however, retention elections
see a far smaller percentage of losses because judges facing retention
elections are unopposed. Between 1990 and 2000, only 3 of 177
(1.7%) state supreme court justices were defeated in retention elec46
tions, and 1964–2006 data suggests that judges in retention election
47
states lose about 1% of the time. Finally, tenure data for appointed
judges show these judges to be more secure in their positions than
48
elected judges.
40
41
42
43
44
45

46

47

48

See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Through the Lens of Diversity: The Fight for Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 10 Mich. J. Race & L. 55, 93 (2004).
See Shepherd, supra note 38, at 1602.
Id.
Chris W. Bonnaeu, Electoral Verdicts: Incumbent Defeats in State Supreme Courts, 33 AM. POL.
RES. 818, 834, 835 tbl.5 (2005).
Shepherd, supra note 38, at 1602–03.
See Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, The Ideologies of Judicial Selection: Empiricism and the
Transformation of the Judicial Selection Debate, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 551, 568 (2008); see also
Shepherd, supra note 38, at 1603.
See Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends 1964–2006, 90 JUDICATURE 208, 210
(2007),
available
at
http://www.ajs.org/ajs/publications/Judicature_PDFs/905/
aspin_905.pdf (containing a ten state survey of retention elections current up to 2006,
showing that between 1964 and 2006, of the 6,306 judges in the ten states subject to retention elections, only fifty-six judges lost their retention elections and fifty-one of the fifty-six judges defeated were trial court judges; thus, only five of the judges who lost retention elections were on state appellate courts); Bonneau, supra note 43, at 825 (stating that
approximately 1.7% of state supreme court justices lose retention elections—a number
consistent with the 1% loss rate of all state court judges facing retention elections).
Id. The loss rate of 1% was calculated by dividing the number of judges who lost retention elections by the total number of judges who faced retention elections in the Aspin
study. See id. A total of fifty-six judges out of 6,306 lost retention elections, which is approximately 1%.
Tenure data grants credence to the notion that state supreme court justices have great
incentive to be attuned to the public by revealing that “on average, reappointed judges
serve 27 percent longer terms than reelected judges” and “reappointed judges are retained at a higher rate than reelected judges.” Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 181–82 (2009).

466

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:2

Today, state supreme court elections—especially contested partisan and nonpartisan races—increasingly involve the mudslinging and
49
attack ads common to other contested political races. Consider, for
example, the 2008 Mississippi Supreme Court elections, where four
justices faced contested nonpartisan reelection bids. Mud came from
challengers, incumbents, and third parties alike. Justice Easley ac50
cused his challenger of being a “deadbeat dad,” and Justice Oliver
Diaz, Jr. was the focus of third-party attack ads alleging he voted “for
51
baby killers, and the murderer of an elderly woman.” In the end,
three of four high court justices would lose their seats to challengers,
52
including the Chief Justice. All told, nearly three million dollars
53
were spent on just these four Mississippi Supreme Court races.
The Mississippi case does not stand alone. Candidates and inter54
est groups increasingly espouse their beliefs on contested issues.
Here are two more examples of this phenomenon: a 2006 Washington ad focused on the candidate and “far right extremists” “so extreme they want to gut protections for our clean air and water. They
55
oppose stem cell research and a woman’s right to choose.” Also in
2006, Alabama’s Chief Justice Drayton Nabers was attacked for allowing a convicted murderer off death row because of “Foreign Law
56
[and] unratified UN Treaties.”
The nastiness of today’s races as well as dramatic increases in the
number of contested races is tied to several factors. Judicial decision
making is more salient today than ever before, especially considering
the declining docket of the U.S. Supreme Court and the increasing
57
deference the Court gives to state decision making. More than that,

49
50
51
52
53

54

55
56
57

See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 307 (2008).
Raheem Dawodu, In Mississippi, Three Justices Sent Packing, GAVEL GRAB (Nov. 6, 2008),
http://www.gavelgrab.org/?p=697.
Don Culpepper, Supreme Court Candidates React to Third Party Negative Ads, WLOX (Oct. 30,
2008), http://www.wlox.com/Global/story.asp?S=9269467&nav=menu40_2.
See Dawodu, supra note 50.
Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics, National Overview Map (2008), FOLLOWTHEMONEY
(May 28, 2010), http://www.followthemoney.org/database/nationalview.phtml?l=0&f=
J&y=2008&abbr=0 [hereinafter FOLLOWTHEMONEY 2008] (comparing contributions to
high court candidates’ campaigns by dollar amount and state for 2008).
See Pozen, supra note 49, at 300–01 (“Judicial candidates increasingly invoke their beliefs
on abortion, same-sex marriage, tort reform, and other controversial issues; if they do not
do so, interest groups may try to ferret them out through questionnaires.”).
FairCourtsPage, 2000–2006 Selected State Supreme Court Ads, YOUTUBE (Feb. 20, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MbdBM_XCyvc&feature=related.
Id.
See Devins, supra note 1, at 1635–39 (discussing the increase in state supreme court decisions which involve constitutional issues, the deference the U.S. Supreme Court gives
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a 2002 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, invalidated on First Amendment grounds a law that prohibited
judicial candidates from taking positions on issues that might come
58
before them. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, there has been
a dramatic infusion of money into judicial campaigns—so much so
that state supreme court justices are under increasing pressure to
59
raise significant funds for reelection.
The correlation between the highest fundraiser in judicial campaigns for state high courts and the winner of the election “has ex60
ceeded 80 percent” since 2000. From 2000 through 2009, $206.4
61
million was raised for judicial campaigns. This is almost two and
one-half times the amount raised for state supreme court campaigns
62
the previous decade (which was $83.3 million from 1990–1999). Although most judicial campaigns did not reach the millions until
2000, when candidates and third parties spent over $45 million on

58
59

60

61
62

such decisions, and the resulting disparity between the U.S. Supreme Court and state supreme court decisions which concern issues of constitutional law).
536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
For these very reasons, efforts at reforming or ridding states of judicial elections have recently been attempted or passed in a few states through both ballot initiatives and legislative action. See Fredreka Schouten, States Act to Revise Judicial Selection: Influence Worries
Rise as Money Floods Races, USA TODAY, Mar. 31, 2010, at 1A. West Virginia and Wisconsin
have adopted public financing systems for judicial elections since December of 2009. Id.
Minnesota had a bill before the legislature that would allow voters to amend the state
constitution to ban competitive elections and replace them with gubernatorial appointment and merit retention elections. Id. Nevada has a constitutional ballot initiative
going before voters in November to permit gubernatorial appointment of judges. Id. Finally, Michigan’s Supreme Court adopted rules in November that permit the court to decide if a member should recuse himself or herself due to a potential conflict of interest.
Id.
Additionally, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has made it
her personal cause to abolish judicial elections. See Sandra Day O’Connor, Op-Ed., Take
Justice off the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, at WK9. Recently, she became Chairwoman
of the newly created O’Connor Judicial Selection Initiative, sponsored by the Institute for
the Advancement of the American Legal System at the University of Denver, which will
“encourag[e] state initiatives to scrap direct judicial elections.” John Schwartz, Effort Begun to Abolish the Election of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at A12; see also O’Connor
Judicial Selection Initiative, Genesis of the Initiative, INST. ADVANCEMENT AM. LEGAL SYS.,
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/judicial_selection.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, too, has voiced her belief that states should abandon judicial elections, stating in March of 2010, “If there’s a reform I would make, it would be
that.” Robert Barnes, Ginsburg Would Forbid Judicial Elections, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2010,
at A2.
JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 2006 20 (2006), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/NewPolitic
sofJudicialElections2006_D2A2449B77CDA.pdf.
Schouten, supra note 59.
Id.
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63

state supreme court judicial elections, some races reached into the
64
millions as early as 1986. Graph 1 below shows the overall trend of
65
state supreme court election spending for the past two decades.
GRAPH 1

Despite some variance, the trend is clearly toward increased
spending. Pro-business interest groups are at the center of the
change in the nature of state supreme court elections; they now account for approximately 44% of all fundraising and 90% of special
63

64

65

Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics, National Overview Map (2000), FOLLOWTHEMONEY,
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/nationalview.phtml?l=0&f=J&y=2000&abbr=0
(last visited Nov.14, 2010) [hereinafter FOLLOWTHEMONEY 2000] (comparing contributions to high court candidates’ campaigns by dollar amount and state for 2000).
The 1986 retention election of California Supreme Court Justices Cruz Reynoso, Joseph
Grodin, and Chief Justice Rose Bird was a contentious battle in which Bird, Grodin, and
Reynoso spent $4.5 million while the campaign against them spent over $7 million. See
Miller, supra note 18, at 212–13 (discussing the ouster of three California Supreme Court
justices in a retention election due to continuous reversal of death sentences in death
penalty appeals). Pennsylvania experienced a high-court million-dollar election as early
as 1989. Campaign Contributors and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 1
(2010), http://www.ajs.org/selection/jnc/docs/AJS-PAstudy3-18-10.pdf (noting that the
two candidates raised $2.5 million in the single 1989 Supreme Court race in Pennsylvania, a state in which justices are initially elected in partisan elections).
Graph 1 is based on data for even-year elections. The vast majority of states with judicial
elections hold them in even years, while only Pennsylvania and Wisconsin consistently
hold odd-year elections. All data for the graph was obtained from the National Institute
on Money in State Politics website, http://www.followthemoney.org.
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66

interest television advertising. For example, in 2005 and 2006, 44%
of campaign donations came from business interests, while 21% came
67
from lawyers.
Expenditures have been almost entirely in the fourteen states with
68
partisan and nonpartisan state supreme court elections.
This is
hardly surprising; justices in the twenty-four states with retention elections win around 99% of the time, and, consequently, there are relatively few issues of sufficient salience to pose electoral risks to these
69
justices. For this reason, the pressure to seek out campaign contributions is very much tied to the retention system employed. We will
now consider how these state-to-state differences might affect justices
and, more generally, the potential pressure justices feel to take into
account the views of either voters or campaign contributors.
D. Ramifications
To start, state supreme court justices, “like all policymakers in a
democracy, . . . must retain their posts in order to achieve their policy
70
goals.” In the thirty-eight states where justices stand for some type
of reelection, “[t]he institutional design creates a direct incentive for
71
judges to consider public opinion in rendering their decisions.”
State supreme court justices are not passive, disconnected actors
when it comes to elections; like any politician, they are motivated and

66

67

68

69

70
71

SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 60, at 7, 18 (explaining percent contribution to negative ads
and percent contribution to overall fundraising). For additional discussion of interest
group influences, see Clive S. Thomas et al., Interest Groups and State Court Elections: A New
Era and Its Challenges, 87 JUDICATURE 135 (2003).
Ifill, supra note 40, at 93–94 (noting how judicial campaign expenditures have “skyrocket[ed]” and are “the most accurate predictor of the outcome of supreme court judicial
races”); SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 60, at 18 (breaking down the contributions to state supreme court candidates’ 2005–2006 campaigns by donor type); see also Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264–65 (2009) (overturning the affirmation of a $50
million jury verdict where one of three affirming judges had been elected as the result of
a $3 million dollar campaign contribution from the CEO of the defendant corporation).
See FOLLOWTHEMONEY 2008, supra note 53, (comparing contributions to high court candidates’ campaigns by dollar amount and state for 2008); FOLLOWTHEMONEY 2000, supra
note 63 (comparing contributions to high court candidates’ campaigns by dollar amount
and state for 2000).
See infra notes 11730 and accompanying text (discussing studies of judicial votes in death
penalty cases and noting how death penalty decisions of justices are among the few issues
highly salient to the public).
Elisha Carol Savchak & A.J. Barghothi, The Influence of Appointment and Retention Constituencies: Testing Strategies of Judicial Decisionmaking, 7 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 394, 396 (2007).
Bradley W. Joondeph, The Many Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial Decision Making, 77 UMKC
L. REV. 347, 365 (2008).
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willing to exert great effort to maintain their seats. Needless to say,
electoral pressures are especially strong in the fourteen states with
contested elections. In these states, justices have a strong incentive to
73
follow public opinion on politically salient issues. More generally,
74
these justices are likely to steer clear of political controversy.
In states that make use of retention elections (where sitting justices almost always win), there are fewer electoral risks. At the same
time, these justices may well take public opinion into account—at
75
least with respect to a handful of highly salient issues. After all, public officials in electoral settings, even those with safe seats, often fear
76
electoral defeat. State supreme court justices are no exception. For
justices subject to reappointment, public opinion is less salient; what
would matter is their relationship with the branch responsible for
77
their reappointment.

72

73

74
75

76

77

See Savchak & Barghothi, supra note 70, at 396 (stating that “[b]ecause most state supreme court judges are at the pinnacle of their legal careers in terms of prestige and their
substantial ability to shape policy, they are likely motivated to please their retention constituencies”).
High-salience issues include abortion, the death penalty, search and seizure, victims’
rights, tort reform, and gay rights. All of these issues have figured in efforts to unseat sitting justices in contested judicial elections. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 49–50 (2003) (noting various nationwide judicial races
where interest groups opposed judges’ reelection campaigns by calling attention to their
previous opinions on controversial matters).
Docket control limits, however, may make it impossible to deny certiorari or otherwise
avoid a politically divisive issue. See supra notes 24–31 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 125–30 and accompanying text (discussing examples—most notably, the
death penalty—of Justices losing their seats in retention elections). In 2010, three Iowa
Supreme Court Justices lost retention bids, presumably because they voted to overturn
the state ban on same-sex marriage. See A.G. Sulzberger, In Iowa, Voters Oust Judges Over
Marriage Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/11/03/us/politics/03judges.html. For reasons discussed infra note 141 and accompanying text, these Justices took electoral risks by bucking public opinion on same
sex marriage.
This is one of the foundational assumptions of political scientists who study congressional
motivations. See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND
CONSTITUENCIES (1974) (evaluating candidates’ behavior in various constituency conditions in light of their motivation to seek reelection); JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN’S
VOTING DECISIONS (2d ed. 1981) (studying how members of the House of Representatives
make voting decisions). On the issue of why lawmakers—even in safe districts—
increasingly focus their attention on reelection concerns, see Neal Devins, The Academic
Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons From Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE
L.J. 1525, 1538–39 (2005) (discussing how the growing partisanship of elections results in
campaigning lawmakers spending less time legislating and more time dealing with reelection and constituents).
See Shepherd, supra note 38, at 1607–08 (“The power over judicial retention held by the
governor or legislature offers the political branches of government direct opportunities
to sanction judges for unpopular rulings. Judges who consistently vote against the inter-
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In addition to retention risks, state justices might take public opinion into account if they thought there was a link between public
opinion and the possible nullification of their decisions through constitutional amendments or, alternatively, perceived that elected officials would be unwilling to implement a decision of which the public
78
disapproves. For example, justices might be more attentive to public opinion in states with direct democracy initiatives than in states
with hard-to-amend constitutions.
In the fourteen states with contested judicial elections, moreover,
justices must also take account of the views of campaign contributors
and party leaders (at least in the four states that make use of partisan
79
election schemes). On issues where these contributors have an economic stake, for example, state justices would have incentive to act in
ways that do not disappoint contributors. This is especially true of issues that are of low political salience. Voters are not likely to know or
80
care about these issues.
Against this backdrop, one would expect significant variations
among state justices. On socially divisive issues, politically insulated
justices would be more apt to be legal policy entrepreneurs than justices who run substantial risks of either losing reelection or having
their decisions overturned by a constitutional amendment or legislation. In other words, justices subject to significant voter and lawmaker checks would likely embrace politically popular positions or, alternatively, steer clear of divisive issues (assuming docket control).
Moreover, justices in states with contested elections would likely take
into account the views of campaign contributors—especially on lowsalience issues.
Part III of this paper will discuss the evidence we have gathered
about state practices and, in so doing, provide support for the above

78

79

80

ests of the other branches of government may hurt their chances for reappointment.”).
For further discussion, see infra note 124.
All political science models assume that the primary motivation of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices is the advancement of their preferred legal policy vision. Consequently, political
scientists who think that the Court is vulnerable to electoral backlash argue that the Justices will act strategically by taking the risk of political reprisal into account. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 370–74](discussing instances where the Court backed public opinion because of actual or anticipated electoral backlash). See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (arguing that U.S. Supreme Court Justices
take numerous factors into account in deciding cases).
In addition to these four states (Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, West Virginia), two other
states (Michigan, Ohio) make use of electoral systems in which party officials play a prominent role. Interview with David Rottman, Principal Court Research Consultant, Nat’l
Ctr. for State Courts (Mar. 30, 2010).
For additional discussion, see infra note 126 and accompanying text.
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claims. Before turning to this evidence, Part II will provide additional
details about the capacity of state justices to assess the risks of voter or
lawmaker reprisals and, more generally, how the legal policy preferences of state justices are often linked to the degree of democratic
accountability in their state’s judicial system.
II. STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND THEIR AUDIENCES

81

By highlighting differences among state constitutional systems,
Part I suggested that justices subject to democratic controls (especially justices in states with contested elections) are more likely to take
voter attitudes into account than are politically insulated justices.
This section will extend this point in two ways. First, by making use of
social psychology, we will argue that justices who run for election, especially contested elections, are more likely to care about their reputations among the mass public than are politically insulated justices.
Second, by looking at state justices’ knowledge of in-state political
conditions, we will argue that state justices subject to democratic controls are more likely to understand the political ramifications of their
decisions. At the same time, because voters are generally unaware of
state supreme court decision making, the risks of being voted out of
office or having a decision negated by voter attitudes are generally
limited to a small number of politically salient cases.
A. Social Psychology, the Mass Public, and Judicial Attitudes Towards Public
Opinion.
In understanding judicial motivation, the dominant political
science models focus on the U.S. Supreme Court and assume that
U.S. Supreme Court Justices are interested in making good law, good
82
policy, or some combination of the two. Some political scientists argue that the Justices need not take public opinion into account,
pointing both to life tenure and the numerous roadblocks that stand
83
in the way of elected government reprisals. Others, however, claim
that the Justices—lacking the powers of purse and sword—are deeply
concerned with their legitimacy and, with it, the willingness of other
parts of government to implement their decisions. As a result, the
81
82

83

The title of this section plays off of LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006).
See Baum & Devins, supra note 3, at 1529–32 (“Whether they seek to make good law, good
policy, or some combination of the two, [political science] scholars think that Justices devote themselves to those ends.”).
See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 44.
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Justices will take care not to issue decisions that significantly diverge
84
from public opinion.
This divide among political scientists largely washes away when
transported to the state supreme court context. Most state justices
stand for reelection and many state constitutions are easy to amend.
In other words, for reasons noted in Part I, most state justices will
have strong incentives to take voter attitudes into account (although
there will be significant variance, depending on the type of reelection
scheme and the availability of other democratic checks on judicial
decision making).
Separate from the risk of political reprisal, to what extent, if at all,
do justices care about the esteem of the voting public and other
groups, most notably, social and political elites? Social psychology
theory emphasizes the basic human desire to be liked and respected,
suggesting that justices—in addition to pursuing favored legal policies—will also take into account their relationships with other justices
as well as power, prestige, reputation, self-respect, and the satisfaction
85
that people seek in a job. In particular, social psychology calls attention to the fact that people want most to be liked and respected by
those to whom they are personally close and to people with whom
they identify. For justices on politically insulated courts, like the U.S.
Supreme Court and a handful of state courts, social psychology suggests that these justices will be especially interested in winning favor
with elites, including bar groups, legal academics, and journalists.
Empirical evidence supports this claim (at least with respect to politically insulated U.S. Supreme Court Justices): U.S. Supreme Court
Justices are political and social elites who travel in social and professional networks dominated by elites and, consequently, care more
86
about elite attitudes than the views of the mass public.
What, then, of state justices who must seek reelection, especially
justices in the fourteen states that have contested elections? “On average,” as Larry Baum notes, “lawyers who are willing to face the elec-

84

85
86

See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 78, at 157–59 (“Because they operate within the greater
social and political context of the society as a whole, the justices also must attend to those
informal rules that reflect dominant societal beliefs about the rule of law in general and
the role of the Supreme Court in particular—the norms of legitimacy.”); Barry Friedman,
Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2606–07 (2003) (asserting that
judicial decision making is often consistent with popular opinion).
This proposition and much of this paragraph is drawn from Baum & Devins, supra note 3,
at 1537.
See Baum & Devins, supra note 3, at 1546–79. No scholar, to the best of our knowledge,
has yet to examine the question of whether state justices on politically insulated courts
are more interested in the views of elites than the views of the general public.
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torate as judicial candidates have a relatively strong interest in the es87
teem of the mass public.” Through formal and informal campaigning, these justices have significant contact with the electorate, contact
that strengthens their “sense of links with the public” and, in turn,
strengthens their desire to be validated by the public through a suc88
cessful reelection bid.
Empirical evidence backs up the social psychology model—at least
with respect to the idea that judges who are subject to contested elections look and act “more like politicians and less like [politically dis89
interested] professionals.” These justices “are more likely to have
gone to a lower-rank law school. They are . . . more politically involved, more locally connected, more temporary, and less well edu90
cated than appointed judges.”

87
88
89

90

BAUM, supra note 84, at 62.
Id.
Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain
Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 290, 327
(2008).
Id. (evaluating state supreme court judges in 1998, 1999, and 2000 and noting that 70%
of state supreme court judges in partisan election states attended an in-state law school
with an average US News ranking of 57.9; in contrast, only 33% of appointed state supreme court judges attended in-state law schools, and the schools that they attended had
an average ranking of 32.3). This observation is bolstered by the cross-over among the
branches at the state level—that is, judges who were former politicians or prosecutors. See
Chris W. Bonneau, The Composition of State Supreme Courts 2000, 85 JUDICATURE 26, 28 tbl.1
(2001) (illustrating the background characteristics of state supreme court justices). Partisan and nonpartisan election states boast more judges with prior prosecutorial experience and prior political electoral experience. Id. at 30 tbl.2.
Analyzing data about all state supreme court justices on the bench in 2000, in the six
states with initial selection partisan judicial elections, all six states had high courts with at
least one-third of its members having prior prosecutorial experience, and four of six
states had benches with at least 50% of its members with prior prosecutorial experience.
Id. Nonpartisan election states boasted fourteen of fifteen states with at least one supreme court judge with prior electoral experience, nine states with three or more judges
with such experience, and four states with at least half of its court members with prior
electoral experience. Id. Prosecutorial experience gives a judge or judicial candidate
great name recognition in his race for office. As expected, merit plan states and gubernatorial/legislative selection states see fewer judges with prosecutorial experience. The
fifteen merit plan states included thirteen states with at least one member with prior experience, but only four states with at least three members with prior electoral experience.
Id. The drop off was even greater in gubernatorial/legislative appointment states, where
eleven of fourteen states had at least one member, but only one state (Massachusetts)
had three or more (and it was three) justices with prior electoral experience. Id. (The
data was calculated by using Table 2 in the Bonneau piece and cross-referencing that
with the number of justices on each state supreme court. For example, if there are nine
justices on the state high court, and the percentage of justices on that court who have
prior prosecutorial experience is 33% in the Bonneau table, then that means three justices have prosecutorial experience.)
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Comparatively, individuals who run in judicial elections have different personality types than those individuals who are appointed to
the bench. Like other politicians, justices in the fourteen states with
contested elections are likely to have a strong “interest in popularity
91
as an end in itself.” In other states, justices are less likely to value
the esteem of the voting public. This is especially true of justices who
are not subject to reelection or reappointment. In other words, as
suggested in Part I, there will be significant variation among state supreme court justices in their attitudes towards the voting public and,
more generally, public opinion.
B. Judicial Capacity, Voter Knowledge, and the Incentives to Take Account of
Public Opinion.
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, where assessments of backlash
92
risks are often a “shot in the dark,” state justices (in states with contested elections) are well versed in state politics because of their direct connections to political parties, voters, campaign contributors,
93
and interest groups. Yet, even in states without contested elections,
state justices typically know a great deal about state politics. Most
state supreme courts, as discussed in Part I, are subject to significant
democratic checks (and sometimes cannot steer clear of political

91
92
93

Courts with justices with prior electoral experience are even more telling as to the
type of person who runs in a judicial election. In legislative and gubernatorial election
states, six of fourteen courts had at least one member with prior electoral experience,
and four of those six had only one member with electoral experience. Id. Interestingly,
South Carolina boasted a court with 100% of justices having prior electoral experience.
Id. In South Carolina, state supreme court justices are selected by the legislature. Perhaps the legislature was selecting from its own members. Merit plan states had only three
state high courts with justices with prior electoral experience: Kansas (one), Missouri
(two), and Utah (one). Id.; see THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at 294
tbl.5.1 (listing the number of justices on each high court). In contrast, twelve of fifteen
nonpartisan judicial election states had at least one member with electoral experience,
and five, or one-third, of states had three or more such members. Bonneau, supra, at 28
tbl.1. In Mississippi and Nevada, more than half of the courts’ members had prior electoral experience. Id. Similarly, five of six partisan election states had at least one member with prior electoral experience. Id. Alabama’s Supreme Court had four of its nine
members with prior electoral experience, which perhaps better explains their contentious and antagonistic elections—the judges are used to that type of election from their
political days. Id.
See BAUM, supra note 81, at 62.
Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 155, 176 (2007).
See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text; infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.
Correspondingly, many of these justices formerly served as elected officials and have
longstanding ties to state voters and the state’s political establishment. See supra note 90;
infra notes 95–99.
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controversy because of limits on their docket control). In direct democracy states, for example, state justices may render advisory opinions about the legality of initiatives, decide legal challenges to initia94
tives, and sometimes have their handiwork overturned by initiatives.
More generally, “state judges are systematically exposed to and
experienced in the legal institutions of their states,” they “spend their
professional lives dealing with state legislation and administrative
regulation,” and “[t]hey are much more likely than are their federal
counterparts to know or be able to learn readily what is out there,
95
how it came to be, and how well or badly it works.” State supreme
court justices echo this sentiment, noting that “state courts are closer
to politics than their federal colleagues, whether . . . elected or ap96
pointed” and are “generally closer to the public, to the legal institutions and environments within the state, and to the public policy
97
process.” A state supreme court justice is almost certainly a longtime resident of her state, presumably reads state newspapers, likely
sits and lives in the state capitol, has professional and social interactions with state officials, hears about state officials, hears about
goings-on from numerous sources, and is generally well-informed
98
with respect to the in-state political climate. As of 2000, 65.7% of
state supreme court justices were born in the state in which they
serve, and 60.5% received their law degrees from a school in that
99
state.
Needless to say, there is tremendous variation among state justices’ knowledge of and interest in state politics and voter opinion.
More than that, the incentive of state justices to take account of voter
attitudes is tied to voter awareness of state court decision making. On
a handful of high-salience issues, as we will discuss in Part III, justices
subject to election—even retention elections—have incentive to take
public opinion into account. As a prime example, justices have lost
100
retention bids because of perceived resistance to the death penalty.

94
95
96
97

98
99
100

See MILLER, supra note 18, at 101–22.
Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norm and
Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 976 (1985).
Linde, supra note 28, at 1286.
Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1168 (1999) (quoting Judith S. Kaye, Contributions of State
Constitutional Law to the Third Century of American Federalism, 13 VT. L. REV. 49, 56 (1988)).
See Hans A. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD
INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 117 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988).
Bonneau, supra note 90, at 28.
See infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
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Outside of criminal justice, abortion, same-sex marriage, and a
few other issues, there is little reason to think that the public is aware
of state supreme court decision making. There is extremely limited
newspaper coverage of state court decision making and, as we will
discuss in Part III, there are next to no opinion polls about either
101
state court decisions or the issues before state supreme courts. In102
deed, the public is generally unaware of judicial decision making.
This is especially true of business issues, as public awareness is largely
103
limited to divisive social issues.
C. Summary
Most state supreme court justices have the incentive and capacity
to take into account potential voter backlash (whether it be electoral
defeat, direct democracy override, or voter approval of a constitutional amendment proposal). There are, however, a limited number
of high-salience issues likely to trigger such a backlash. Nevertheless,
justices subject to some form of reelection are likely to be risk averse
and, consequently, will steer clear of issues that arguably run reelection risks. This is especially true for justices in states that make use of
contested elections. These elections are more contested than ever
before, including significant expenditures on negative campaign ads.
In addition to electoral risks, some state justices are likely to care
about public opinion because they have strong personal interests in
the esteem of the mass public. This is especially true of justices who
participate in contested races. Many of these justices previously
served as elected officials and are strongly interested in strengthening
their links with the public. On the other hand, justices appointed
through a judicial commission or some other merit plan are more
likely to identify with lawyer groups, judges, and other elites. Likewise, justices who are not subject to reappointment (because they
serve until they are seventy or have life tenure) are more likely to
identify with elites than with the mass public.
Variations in state systems suggest that politically insulated justices
will be less interested in public opinion than elite opinion and more
willing to play a path-breaking role on socially divisive issues. For example, justices in states with hard-to-amend constitutions are more

101
102

103

See infra note 104.
For example, the great majority of U.S. Supreme Court decisions receive little attention
in the mass media and are unknown to the mass public. For a summary of this data, see
Friedman, supra note 84, at 2620–23. See also Baum & Devins, supra note 3, at 1548–51.
See Baum & Devins, supra note 3, at 1549–50.
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likely to play a leadership role on social issues than justices subject to
direct-democracy initiatives. At the other extreme, justices subject to
contested elections will be both sensitive to public opinion and risk
averse, especially with respect to high-salience issues. These justices,
moreover, are under increasing pressure to raise campaign contributions and, consequently, are likely to take into account the views of
business constituencies—especially on low-salience economic issues.
Justices subject to retention election (where justices win 99% of the
time) will pay limited attention to public opinion. On the death penalty, abortion, and other issues where there is some risk of voter retaliation, justices subject to retention election are likely to be attentive to public opinion. On most issues, however, these justices are not
likely to pay much attention to public opinion, especially if they were
appointed under a merit plan (so that they will personally identify
with lawyer groups and other judges). Finally, justices subject to gubernatorial or legislative reappointment are likely to pay attention to
the policy preferences of the reappointing body—something that will
likely but not necessarily track public opinion.
In the next Part, we will test these claims by looking at existing
empirical evidence (including evidence we collected for this paper)
about the sensitivity of state supreme court justices to public opinion.
We will consider the import of differences in state systems, the salience of the issue, and the role of campaign contributors and other
economic interests. As we will now explain, the evidence matches our
claims (but is far too limited to be seen as definitive in any way).
III. ANALYZING THE EVIDENCE
In Parts I and II, we suggested the following: (1) Public opinion
will matter to some but not all justices. In states with contested elections, justices will follow the public’s lead on high-salience issues. In
states with retention elections, public opinion will be of limited relevance. In states where justices are subject to reappointment, the opinion of the reappointing body—not public opinion—will matter.
Likewise, public opinion will play a role in states where justices are
not subject to reappointment. (2) In states with contested elections,
justices need to raise significant funds and are otherwise vulnerable
to privately funded negative advertising. Consequently, the views of
campaign contributors and other economic interests are likely to influence judicial behavior in these states. This is especially true on
low-salience issues. (3) States subject to significant democratic checks
are not likely to make path-breaking decisions on divisive social is-
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sues; justices in politically insulated states are more likely to issue
pathbreaking decisions.
We will now examine each of these propositions in this Part. In
part, we will make use of existing studies. In part, we will supplement
these studies by seeking to match public opinion poll data with state
supreme court decision making on a few high-salience issues. Before
turning to our findings, a few words about the state of the literature
and the limitations of our study are in order. To start, little data exists regarding state public opinion of state supreme courts, issues, or
104
decisions, or the effects of public opinion on state supreme courts.
The research that has been done largely focuses on criminal law, es105
Research has also been done on
pecially capital punishment.
whether state supreme courts favor business interests, especially the
linkage between campaign contributions and state supreme court de106
cision making.
Finally, there is some research on whether path-

104

105

106

Public opinion research has largely focused on the U.S. Supreme Court. Other papers in
this symposium highlight some of this research as do Friedman, supra note 4, and PUBLIC
OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J.
Egan eds., 2008). This is not to say that no efforts have been made to gather data about
state courts in general or state supreme courts in particular. The largest state supreme
court data collection undertaking—the State Supreme Court Data Project—headed by
Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall, gathered the state supreme court decisions of all fifty
states during court sessions from 1995 through 1998, as well as the biographical data of
all justices who were on the bench during that period. See State Supreme Court Data
Project, Project Overview, RICE U., http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~pbrace/statecourt/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2010). This database has allowed for a great deal of research on state supreme courts; however, at this point the data set is twelve years old and thus dated. Other
studies have gathered data on specific state supreme courts or specific issues and are thus
more targeted and limited. See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors
a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at A1 (focusing on the Ohio Supreme
Court and the effect of justices accepting campaign contributions from parties before the
court or groups filing supporting briefs).
Data collection on fifty state supreme courts is clearly a massive undertaking, but likely a necessary one to gain further insight on state supreme court decision making, particularly the influence of public opinion on decision making (not to mention the need for
public opinion surveys and data collection related to state supreme court issues and rulings). Given that most law and most constitutional decisions are made at the state level,
the data void is particularly unfortunate. The limitations on this preliminary analysis are
numerous, but cannot be helped given the unavailability of data.
See infra notes 125–28 and accompanying text (discussing some of this research). In explaining their focus on death cases, researchers have noted the availability of data on
public opinion about the death penalty and, consequently, that it is the “most reasonable
place to look for linkage.” Paul Brace & Brent Boyea, State Supreme Court Decision-Making:
A Re-Evaluation of the Electoral Connection 6 (2004) (presented at the 2004 annual meeting
of the American Political Science Association) (on file with authors).
See infra notes 144–60 and accompanying text.
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breaking state supreme courts are politically insulated and on the
propensity of justices subject to gubernatorial or legislative reap108
pointment to back up the policy views of the reappointing body.
One aim of this paper is to start to fill a gap in the currently available research, looking at the potential linkage between state supreme
court decision making and public opinion on high-salience issues
outside criminal justice. We focused on a few high-salience issues
that were likely to have both public opinion polls and state supreme
court cases on point.
A. Methodology
First we searched for available public opinion polls for states, dividing them into groups by retention election method. We searched
for public opinion on abortion, education (particularly school funding), gay marriage/civil unions, eminent domain, medical marijuana,
109
gun control, and immigration.
Then, using keyword searches in
Westlaw and Lexis Nexis state supreme court databases and state
news databases, we searched for state supreme court cases on these
topics. Cases were matched to public opinion only if the issue of the
case and the topic of the public opinion were sufficiently correlated,
meaning of or relating to the same topic or sufficiently close that a
reasonable inference could logically relate the case to the public opinion. This was done for each grouping of states such that searches
were performed on virtually all states within each group. This admittedly unscientific approach, which represents just the first step in gathering data given limited resources and time, was performed with
sufficient scope to cover nearly every state such that basic conclusions
can be carefully drawn from this cursory analysis.

107
108
109

See Devins, supra note 1, at 1674–84 (discussing state court considerations in deciding
same-sex marriage).
See generally Shepherd, supra note 38 (arguing that judges seeking reappointment
“vote . . . strategically” as much or more than elected judges).
Again, these topics were picked because of their often contentious nature and knowledge
of the existence of at least some case law and/or public opinion on each topic. For example, equalizing public school funding has been a big topic in states since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24
(1972), in which the Court held that the right to an equal education is not a fundamental
right under the U.S. Constitution. Similarly, there are constant litigation and public opinion polls on same-sex marriage and civil unions. Eminent domain has been a hot topic
since the Court’s ruling in Kelo v. City of New London. 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (holding
that the City of New London’s redevelopment plan, promising to bring economic growth
and new jobs to the plighted area, qualified as constitutionally permissible “public use”
under the Fifth Amendment).
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B. Limitations
Limitations of this analysis are numerous. Regression models are
not used. The analysis does not account for potentially relevant factors that could explain the below-stated outcomes, such as the ideology of the state supreme court justices. Importantly, because of the
dearth of systematic reporting of state public opinion and state supreme court opinions, the public opinion poll data used does not al110
ways directly correlate with the state supreme court opinions. Public opinion polls do not necessarily predate the high court case,
111
either. Finally, the amount of available data is limited by the availability of state public opinion, by the issues that have come before the
state high courts, and by the overlap between these two sets.
Despite these limitations, we believe the public opinion polls are a
useful tool for analysis based on our above discussion of features that
would seem to make state supreme courts more democratically accountable to the public—particularly the greater knowledge base of a
state supreme court justice about state opinion by virtue of being a
member of the state and being actively involved in multiple areas of
112
state government and life.
Thus, we take a cautious first step in
comparing public opinion with state supreme court decision making.
C. Public Opinion and State Supreme Court Decision Making: Existing
Studies
With close to 90% of state supreme court justices facing some type
113
of retention election, it is to be expected that public opinion will
directly influence state court decision making (either the substance
of a decision or—in states with docket control—the decision whether
to hear a case). In states with contested elections, state justices, like
other politicians, “have a tendency to vote in accordance with perceived constituency preferences on visible issues, simply because the

110

111

112
113

For example, a state poll about support for same-sex marriage may be used to indicate
public opinion about same-sex parentage and adoption when a case on the latter comes
before the state high court.
Public opinion polls predating the relevant state supreme court opinion are obviously
optimal, as they indicate a known public sentiment in existence before the court’s ruling.
This makes it more likely that the court is aware of the public sentiment and can knowingly choose to act or not act in accordance with it.
See supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text (discussing the characteristics of state supreme court justices).
See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1105 app.
2 (2007).
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failure to do so is politically dangerous.”
Indeed, elected officials
and judges alike fear challenge and defeat even when there is little to
115
no chance of it occurring. “[R]egardless of how safe their positions
116
are, public officials in an electoral setting often fear the voters.”
Evidence on the role of public opinion focuses on the impact of
judicial elections. Studies show that particular issues, such as crime
and the death penalty, get judges subject to all election types (partisan, nonpartisan, and retention) to consider public opinion. In a
famous statement about the effect of judicial elections, former California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus stated that “[t]here’s no way
a judge is going to be able to ignore the political consequences of
certain decisions, especially if he or she has to make them near election time. That would be like ignoring a crocodile in your bath117
tub.”
An eight-state study of state supreme court death penalty cases
analyzing, among other things, age of justices, term length, ideologies, and case facts, similarly determined that competition in states
with partisan and non-partisan ballots encourage conservative voting
patterns for justices who otherwise might vote to overturn death sen118
tences.
A different study focusing on death penalty cases in four
state supreme courts found a statistically significant relationship between the process for electing judges and voting of liberal justices
119
with the conservative majority in death penalty cases.
Moreover, a study by Elisha Savchak and A.J. Barghothi found that
there was “overwhelming evidence of the constraining effect of retention mechanisms” and concluded, unsurprisingly, that judges are
more influenced by those who must retain them than those who
114
115

116
117
118
119

Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in the American
States, 23 AM. POL. Q. 485, 489 (1995).
Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections, in
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 165, 167 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007) (noting that from 1980–2000, although
only 5.6% of House of Representatives incumbents running for reelection were defeated,
House members facing reelection continued to employ numerous strategies to secure
votes).
See Hall, supra note 114, at 488.
Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, 73 A.B.A. J. 52, 58 (1997).
Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, and
Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206, 1221–23 (1997).
See Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J.
POL. 427, 431 (1992) (describing a Louisiana case study that found that liberal justices
were more likely to disregard their personal preferences and vote according to constituent preferences when facing reelection). The four state supreme courts studied were the
Texas Criminal Court of Appeals, the North Carolina Supreme Court, the Louisiana Supreme Court, and the Kentucky Supreme Court. Id. at 434.
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120

place them on the bench. Using a very large data set covering fifteen states with retention elections, examining all criminal cases (not
just death penalty cases), and controlling for judge ideology, Savchak
and Barghothi found that state supreme court judges are influenced
by their retention constituencies, but more so near the end of their
121
term when their retention election is near.
A study by Joanna
Shepherd unsurprisingly found the strongest results with judges facing partisan reelection, with results substantially weaker for judges re122
tained through non-partisan or retention election.
Appointed
judges, on the other hand, responded far less to the will of the electorate and more to the will of the governor or legislature that ap123
pointed them.
Finally, as would be expected, studies show that
judges in their last term before mandatory retirement, and thus accountable to no one, responded less to political will of any sort than
124
other judges.
Of course, public opinion can only influence those issues of which
the public actually is aware and on which it has formed an opinion.
Indeed, the reason that political scientists have focused their energy
on the death penalty and other criminal justice issues is tied to the
125
salience of these issues with voters.
In Georgia (a state with contested elections), a state “Supreme Court justice acknowledged that
the elected justices of that court may have overlooked errors, leaving

120
121
122
123
124

125

Savchak & Barghothi, supra note 70, at 396.
Id. at 400, 405.
Shepherd, supra note 48, at 171.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 190, 192. Shepherd’s study also indicates that judge voting changes immediately
after election of a governor from the opposite party than previously held office, suggesting that judges use the governor’s party affiliation as a proxy for the retention
agent/voter’s preferences. Id. at 193. For one of the most recent writings on the death
penalty, see Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the
Practice of Electing Judges, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 360, 360 (2008) (“On the highly salient issue
of the death penalty, mass opinion and the institution of electing judges systematically influence court composition and judge behavior.”). See also Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea,
Judicial Selection Methods and Capital Punishment in the American States, in RUNNING FOR
JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 115, at 188–89 [hereinafter Brace & Boyea, Judicial Selection Methods]; Stephen B.
Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights
and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 791–92 (1995) (“As a result of the
increasing prominence of the death penalty in judicial elections as well as other campaigns for public office, judges are well aware of the consequences to their careers of unpopular decisions in capital cases.”).
See Brace & Boyea, Judicial Selection Methods, supra note 124, at 188–89 (suggesting that the
issue of capital punishment is ideally situated to test the effect of public opinion on judicial decision making because it is a highly visible controversy that receives extensive media coverage).
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federal courts to remedy them via habeas corpus, because ‘[federal
judges] have lifetime appointments. Let them make the hard deci126
sions.’” Even in retention states, a justice’s vote in capital cases can
127
be used to turn “retention elections. . . into partisan contests.”
In
Colorado, the state’s governor led the charge to have voters remove
128
one of his appointees based on that justice’s votes in capital cases.
In California, three justices lost retention elections in 1986 because of
129
their votes in opposition to the death penalty, and in Tennessee,
Justice Penny White lost her retention election in 1996 due to (per130
haps false) depictions of her vote in a capital case.
D. Public Opinion and State Supreme Court Decision Making: A Step
Beyond Criminal Justice Issues
Outside of criminal justice issues, there is good reason to think
both that state justices take account of public opinion and that the
more electorally accountable justices are far more interested in public opinion than are politically insulated justices. In researching this
question, we were able to match public opinion to state supreme
court decisions in a total of twenty-seven instances ranging across topics such as abortion, same-sex marriage, gun control, education, eminent domain, immigration, and Indian gaming. States are grouped
131
by their retention election method, with each state’s judicial selec126
127

128
129

130

131

Bright & Keenan, supra note 124, at 799 (alteration in original) (quoting Katie Wood, Not
Just a Rubber Stamp Anymore, FULTON CNTY. DAILY REP. (Ga.), Jan. 25, 1993, at 1, 5).
James C. Foster, The Interplay of Legitimacy, Elections, and Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Making
Sense of Politicization of Oregon’s Appellate Courts, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1313, 1333–34
(2003) (quoting Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing
the Myths of Judicial Reform, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 315, 326 (2001)).
Bright & Keenan, supra note 124, at 786.
See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 689, 737 (1995) (“The 1986 electoral defeat of three justices of the California
Supreme Court, largely in response to their positions on the constitutionality of the death
penalty, is a clear example of how elected judges are increasingly accountable to electoral
majorities.”).
See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 314–15
(1997) (discussing defeat of Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White due to the
Republican Party’s portrayal of her vote in a capital case as indicia of an anti-death penalty position).
We use retention election method instead of the states’ initial selection method because
we are interested in determining whether judges who face contested elections on a continuing basis are more democratically accountable. For example, although Pennsylvania
has partisan elections for the initial selection of state supreme court judges, retention
elections are done as though a merit plan state. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra
note 14, at 303 (listing both initial selection and retention selection methods for all fifty
states). While there is still likely to be some level of public pressure on these judges,
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tion method represented by at least one data point. A table of the
data sets used for this analysis is located in the Appendix. There is
one data point for partisan election states, five data points for nonpartisan election states, ten points for merit plan states that make use
of retention elections, and eleven points for gubernatorial/legislative
appointment states. It is interesting to note the lack of data points
for partisan states. The one data point available is consistent with our
expectations, and so too, the lack of data is also consistent with our
expectation that partisan states would be more cautious and make
fewer rulings on high-salience issues. And, because there is no public
opinion on low-salience issues, there is no data in that area to compare either. Partisan states appear to be flying under the radar of
public opinion, either matching state public opinion or artfully avoiding decisions that will stir the masses. Perhaps for the same reason,
there is a limited amount of available data for nonpartisan judicial
132
election states.
Nonpartisan states followed public opinion in four (arguably five)
out of five available cases, on topics of same-sex marriage, medical
133
marijuana, and eminent domain.
Washington’s 2010 decision on
medical marijuana is the only one that arguably does not follow public opinion. By ruling that a 1998 voter initiative only provided an af-

132

133

judges facing this type of retention election lose their seats less than 1% of the time. See
Joanna Shepherd, The Business of Judicial Elections (Oct. 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available
at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/shepherd_business
ofelections_octdraft.pdf (noting that judges’ voting in cases involving business interests in
states where they are initially selected in partisan elections but retained through retention
elections more closely resembles that of judges who face retention elections).
This may be a function of the manner in which data was gathered for this paper. Research assistants were asked to search for public opinion and supreme court cases on the
following topics: gay marriage, abortion, education, eminent domain, medical marijuana, gun control, immigration, crime (generally, and to the exclusion of the death penalty), and miscellaneous. It also may be that there was available public opinion data or an
available state supreme court case, but either they did not align closely enough for comparison, or both items did not exist on the same topic.
Ohio followed public opinion in an eminent domain decision—not surprisingly given the
national rejection of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London in
2005. 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (holding that the use of eminent domain for the purpose
of economic development satisfies the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause). Both local and national outrage over that decision likely put
Ohio’s Supreme Court on notice of the overwhelming rejection of the idea that government could take private property for economic development. See Joyce Howard Price,
Drawing the Line on Eminent Domain: States Rush to Counter Court Ruling, WASH. TIMES, Oct.
9, 2005, at A1 (noting national rejection of Kelo and legislation proposed or introduced in
30 states, including Ohio, to curb or restrict eminent domain powers); Correy E. Stephenson, States Battle High Court Takings Case, LAW. WKLY. USA, Aug. 15, 2005 (describing
public outcry and state legislative activity in response to the Kelo decision).
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firmative defense to users of medical marijuana in state court proceedings, the Washington Supreme Court rejected arguments that
police did not have probable cause to search the home of an individ134
ual with a document purporting to authorize his use of marijuana.
In narrowing the scope of the medical marijuana initiative, the Court
arguably did not back public opinion. At the same time, the Court
followed the generally accepted understanding of what the initiative
135
allowed (so, perhaps, the Court was following voter intent) and the
marijuana user in question had more than two pounds of marijuana
as well as scales and other drug paraphernalia (suggesting that he was
not the type of individual whom voters sought to protect through the
136
initiative).
In retention election states, decisions followed public opinion in
six of ten cases. Two cases where public opinion was not followed
took place in Alaska and Iowa. Alaska’s Supreme Court struck down
a law requiring parental consent for minors before obtaining an
abortion—a law heavily supported by the state population (80% in
137
favor).
The court held that the law unconstitutionally restricted a
minor’s right to privacy, a right given to minors under the state con138
stitution.
Though against public opinion, the decision was consis139
tent with the court’s precedent over the past ten years, which has
upheld a minor’s privacy right while explicitly stating that a valid law
could be implemented “which ensures that parents are notified so
134

135

136

137
138
139

State v. Fry, 228 P.3d 1, 5 (Wash. 2010) (noting that authorization to use marijuana does
not make the act of possessing and using marijuana noncriminal or negate any elements
of the charged offense).
See WASH. CITIZENS FOR MED. RIGHTS, THE WASHINGTON STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA ACT:
A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS AND PHYSICIANS (1999), http://www.eventure.com/i692/Pages/
brochure.html (explaining the Act’s goal of providing exemption from criminal penalties
for the use of medical marijuana).
Fry, 228 P.3d at 3. Three months after its Fry ruling, the Washington Supreme Court
agreed to hear an appeal by the ACLU involving a medical marijuana claimant who lost
her job because she lawfully consumed marijuana at her house for medicinal purposes.
See Press Release, ACLU of Wash., State Supreme Court to Review Firing of Medical Marijuana Patient (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.aclu-wa.org/news/state-supreme-court-reviewfiring-medical-marijuana-patient. This case, unlike Fry, presents the Court with a sympathetic plaintiff and, as such, will be a much better measure of whether the Washington
Supreme Court is willing to risk voter backlash by narrowly interpreting the medical marijuana initiative.
Lieutenant Governor Loren Leman Called on Alaska Supreme Court to End an Eight-Year Delay in
Implementing Law to Protect Parental Rights, STATES NEWS SERV., Apr. 13, 2005.
State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska (Planned Parenthood II), 171 P.3d 577, 582 (Alaska
2007).
See State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska (Planned Parenthood I), 35 P.3d 30, 41 (Alaska
2001) (recognizing that fundamental reproductive rights include the right to an abortion).
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that they can be engaged in their daughters’ important decisions in
140
these matters.”
Iowa’s Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a law that
limited marriage to one man and one woman, despite lack of support
for gay marriage at the time of the decision (30.4% in favor of gay
141
marriage).
Iowa, though selecting its judges through nonpartisan
elections initially, retains judges through retention elections, similar
142
to Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania was responsible for the two other
cases decided by merit plan states that did not align with public opinion, one of which held that workers compensation was available to
illegal aliens despite strong support (70–80%) against granting more
143
rights for illegal aliens.
Given the available data, we can see that all in all, regardless of the
method of retention for state supreme court justices, on high-profile
issues such as same-sex marriage, gun control, and abortion, among
others, the courts generally align with public opinion. That said, it is
relatively clear that the retention method is relevant to the frequency
that state courts decide cases contrary to popular public opinion.
States where judges are appointed by the governor or legislature and
serve long terms (to age seventy or life) had a high rate of ruling
against public opinion. Nonpartisan elected justices voted in line
with public opinion in at least 80% of cases used in this preliminary
analysis. The limited amount of data for state courts using partisan
140
141

142
143

Planned Parenthood II, 171 P.3d at 579.
For further discussion of the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision and the role of the public,
see Devins, supra note 1, at 1680 (2010) (contending that the political climate in Iowa was
much more tolerant of same-sex marriage than opinion poll data suggests). In 2010,
three of these Justices lost retention bid, presumably because of their votes on same-sex
marriage. See supra note 75. In making sense of this electoral defeat, public opinion on
same-sex marriage is highly salient. Other factors at play included the role of out-of-state
interests in funding this electoral campaign (something that could have been anticipated
by Iowa Justices) and the nation-wide anti-incumbent malaise in 2010 (something that
could not have been anticipated). For additional discussion, see Devins, supra note 17, at
88–102 (discussing role of national interests in resisting state court efforts to legalize
same-sex marriage). See also Sandy Adkins, Anti-Incumbent Mood Extends to Court-Related
Elections, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, News Release, Nov. 3, 2010, available at
http://www.ncsc.org/newsroom/news-releases/2010/election-roundup.aspx (noting anti-incumbency sentiment in 2010 elections).
See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at 303 tbl.5.6.
See Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 810 A.2d 99, 109 (Pa. 2002)
(upholding an award for an unauthorized alien under the Workers’ Compensation Act).
Public opinion found 72% of Pennsylvanians supported stricter immigration laws, and
82% opposed granting drivers’ licenses to illegal aliens. See Pennsylvania, FED’N AM.
IMMIGR.
REFORM,
http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=research_
polldataPA (last visited Nov. 14, 2010) (reporting the results of a poll asking likely voters
in Pennsylvania their views on immigration issues).
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and nonpartisan election schemes is consistent with the expectancy
that those courts would prove more democratically accountable to
the public than courts with merit plan and appointed justices. Furthermore, the limited data for nonpartisan, and particularly partisan
selection states, may suggest that those courts are less inclined to hear
high-salience cases in the first place, and second, less inclined to rule
against the public if the retention method is another partisan or
nonpartisan election.
Finally, appointed courts appear even less likely to follow public
opinion than would be expected given that judges do not face voters
for retention of their seats. Merit selection courts aligned with public
opinion 60% of the time, while appointed state supreme courts paralleled public opinion in only 64% of cases. These two types of courts
were expected to be less accountable to the public than partisan and
nonpartisan selection courts, and there is reason to believe this is true
given the higher number of high-salience cases heard in each of
these types of courts. Resolving a higher number of visible cases increases the possibility of greater media attention and scrutiny, including criticism for the court and its justices. We would expect justices
subject to partisan and nonpartisan elections to avoid this attention,
or seek it only when ruling in support of public opinion. The overall
data here indicates possible support for this expectancy. However,
further research is necessary.
E. Money, Judicial Elections, and State Supreme Court Decision Making:
Low-Salience Issues and Business Interests
Given the dearth of public opinion data on state supreme court
decisions for high-salience issues, it is no surprise that there is virtually no public opinion on low-salience issues that come before state supreme courts. However, the void in public opinion does not mean
state supreme court justices are not influenced by outside forces
when it comes to low-salience issues. Quite the contrary, empirical
and anecdotal evidence back up the commonsense claim that state
justices who run in contested elections are sensitive to the business
interests that fund their campaigns and run television ads. To start,
judges themselves recognize the role of money and its influence on
both elections and court decisions: in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., a 2009 U.S. Supreme Court decision about the influence of cam144
paign contributions on state supreme court decision making, a coa144

The precise issue before the Court was whether a state justice needed to recuse himself
from a case in which one of the parties had made significant campaign contributions to
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lition of twenty-seven former chief justices filed an amicus brief stating that “[s]ubstantial financial support of a judicial candidate—
whether contributions to the judge’s campaign committee or independent expenditures—can influence a judge’s future decisions,
145
both consciously and unconsciously.”
One Ohio Supreme Court
justice was quoted as saying that he “never felt so much like a hooker
down by the bus station in any race [he has] ever been in as [he] did
146
in a judicial race.”
On the more empirical end, a 2002 survey of
2,428 state court judges done by Justice at Stake reported that almost
half of the judges surveyed thought campaign contributions influ147
enced decisions.
Reports on the Texas, Ohio, Alabama, and Georgia Supreme
Courts also call attention to the influence of donations on decisions.
A study of the Texas Supreme Court revealed that petitioners to the
court who had donated $250,000 or more were ten times more likely
than a non-contributor to have a petition for discretionary review
148
granted.
A second study of the Texas Court (focusing on 1994–
149
The
1997 rulings) also concluded that “decisions follow dollars.”
study found that when contributions from plaintiffs and their lawyers

145

146

147
148

149

the justice. By a five to four vote, the Supreme Court concluded that recusal was required, noting that “there is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or
directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263–64 (2009).
Brief of 27 Former Chief Justices and Justices as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5,
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22). The brief also
claimed that justices, as humans, were “fundamentally incapable of complete impartiality
and indifference” and that there are some cases where a judge cannot recognize her own
bias. Id. at 6. But cf. Brief of Ten Current and Former Chief Justices and Justices as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252
(2009) (No. 08-22) (showing there is a presumption, both in the public and in rulings by
the United States Supreme Court, of judicial integrity).
See Liptak & Roberts, supra note 104 (quoting Justice Paul E. Pfeifer of the Ohio Supreme
Court). Prior to being elected to the bench in 1992, Pfeifer served “one term in the
[Ohio] House of Representatives and four terms in the [Ohio] Senate.” Paul E. Pfeifer,
Justice, OHIO JUD. CENTER, http://www.ohiojudicialcenter.gov/pfeifer.asp (last visited
Nov. 14, 2010).
Liptak & Roberts, supra note 104.
Brief of The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. at 14, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No.
08-22) (citing Pay to Play: How Big Money Buys Access to the Texas Supreme Court, TEXANS FOR
PUBLIC JUSTICE 10 (2001), http://info.tpj.org/docs/2001/04/reports/paytoplay/
paytoplay.pdf).
Madhavi McCall, The Politics of Judicial Elections: The Influence of Campaign Contributions on
the Voting Patterns of Texas Supreme Court Justices, 1994–1997, 31 POL. & POL’Y 314, 315
(2003).
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exceeded contributions from defendant’s lawyers, there was an increased probability of a vote for plaintiff: “[w]hen the plaintiff contributes more than the defendant, the probability of a vote for the
plaintiff doubles,” but when all four parties contribute (parties and
150
lawyers), justices vote consistently with their preferences. A similar
study of the Georgia Supreme Court in 2003 found that in those cases
where the conservative side contributed more than the liberal attorneys, the conservative side won; while when liberal attorneys contri151
buted more, their side won 65% of the time.
A twelve-year study of Ohio Supreme Court Justices found justices
voting in favor of parties who had made campaign contributions 70%
152
of the time. One justice voted in favor of his contributors 91% of
153
the time and, in 2006, the New York Times reported that all justices
in the majority of a 4-3 class action lawsuit had received campaign
contributions from the defendant companies and that all justices in
the dissent had accepted campaign contributions from lawyers for the
154
plaintiff.
A 2001 study of the Alabama Supreme Court looked at
106 arbitration decisions between 1995 and 1999 and found a “remarkably close correlation between a justice’s votes on arbitration
155
cases and his or her source of campaign funds.” Justices funded by
plaintiff’s lawyers opposed arbitration, while those funded by business
supported arbitration—the correlation “pervades the entire area of
156
the law.”
Finally, two studies done by Joanna Shepherd also found a business influence on judicial elections. She found that in 2004, a donation of $100,000 to a judge in a partisan election system increased the

150

151
152

153
154
155
156

Id. at 326. Breaking this down into numbers: plaintiffs are six times more likely to get a
justice’s vote when the contribution exceeds the defendants’ (62% versus 10% chance).
Id. at 328. Plaintiffs are seven times more likely to win if the plaintiff’s lawyer contributed
more to the justice than defendant’s lawyers (56.6% versus 7.5%). Id. “Indeed, plaintiffs
are rarely victorious absent contributions. . . .” Id. The study also finds that a justice is
more likely to vote for a plaintiff if an election is imminent. Id. at 329.
Damon M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 7 ST.
POL. & POL’Y Q. 281, 287 (2007).
Brief of The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 148, at 15 (citing Liptak & Roberts, supra note 104). The Brennan Center also
reported that “[i]n a written survey of 2,428 state lower, appellate, and Supreme Court
judges, almost half (46 percent) of the judges surveyed indicated a belief that campaign
contributions to judges influence decisions.” Id. at 18.
Liptak & Roberts, supra note 104.
Id.
Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 646 (1999).
Id. at 662.
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business’ chances of winning by 69% in a products liability case.
Her more recent study of the influence of business interests on state
supreme courts found that a judge facing partisan reelection was 23%
more likely to vote in favor of the business litigant in a tort case and
158
14% more likely in a contract case. Shepherd also reports that the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce spent over $100 million on judicial election campaigns between 2000 and 2003, and that between 2000 and
2004, the Chamber of Commerce was successful in getting its candidate—all pro-business judges—elected in thirty-six of forty elec159
tions.
In highlighting the success of business interests in advancing their
agendas, Shepherd and others make two related points that reinforce
our claims about public opinion and state court decision making.
First, justices may be especially influenced by business interests in rulings on low-salience issues such as contracts and arbitration. Second,
business interests—when taking out their own advertisements—often
160
emphasize crime and other high-salience issues.
In this way, business interests recognize that the nexus between public opinion and
judicial decision making is largely limited to a handful of highsalience issues.
F. The Characteristics of Path-Breaking State Supreme Courts: Lessons from
161
Same-Sex Marriage
States that make use of contested elections, as noted above, provided us with very few data points about the linkage of public opinion
on high-salience issues and state court decision making. This suggests that these state supreme courts steer away from divisive social
issues. Another measure of this phenomenon is to look at the characteristics of state supreme courts that have played a path-breaking
role on a high-salience issue. As we will now explain, an examination
of state supreme court decision making on same-sex marriage reveals
that politically insulated courts are apt to play a path-breaking role.
From 1993 to 2009, seven state supreme courts interpreted their
constitutions to provide expansive protections to same-sex couples.
Four of these states mandated same-sex marriage (Massachusetts, Cal157
158
159
160
161

Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 670 (2008).
Shepherd, supra note 131, at 22.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
This subpart is drawn from Devins, supra note 1, at 1674–84. One of us, Neal Devins, is
now researching the characteristics of path-breaking courts on a broader range of issues.
This research is in too preliminary a state to be included in this essay.
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ifornia, Connecticut, and Iowa); two mandated marriage or civil union protections (Vermont and New Jersey); one said that it would apply strict scrutiny review in assessing the state ban on same-sex mar162
riage (Hawaii). The most salient characteristic shared by all seven
courts is their retention schemes. None of the seven make use of
163
contested judicial elections. Five are among the eleven states whose
justices need not run for reelection: two (Massachusetts and New Jersey) are among the four states whose justices are not subject to ree164
lection or reappointment; two (Vermont and Connecticut) are
from the six states that make use of a legislative or gubernatorial
165
reappointments; one (Hawaii) is the only state that makes use of a
judicial commission to reappoint justices. The remaining two (California and Iowa) are states that make use of retention elections—
166
elections where incumbent justices win around 99% of the time.
Of the seven path-breaking states, only California and Massachusetts allow voters to place constitutional amendment proposals on the
167
ballot.
For legislature-sponsored amendments, only two states
(Iowa and Massachusetts) allow for an amendment to be sent to the
voters with only majority (as opposed to supermajority) support from
168
state lawmakers.
Iowa and Massachusetts, however, are two of
twelve states that require consideration of legislature-proposed con169
stitutional amendments in two successive sessions. Iowa’s constitu-

162

163

164

165
166
167

168
169

For the states mandating same-sex marriage, see Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa
2009); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003). For the states mandating civil unions, see Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J.
2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). For Hawaii’s decision to apply strict scrutiny, see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
With respect to judicial appointments, two states make use of merit plan appointments
(Hawaii and Iowa); four use gubernatorial appointments (California, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Vermont); and one uses legislative appointment (Connecticut). See supra
Table 1.
In Massachusetts, justices serve until they are seventy. In New Jersey, justices are subject
to an initial gubernatorial reappointment and then serve until they are seventy. See supra
note 9.
See supra note 9.
See id.
John F. Cooper, The Citizen Initiative Petition to Amend State Constitutions: A Concept Whose
Time Has Passed, or a Vigorous Component of Participatory Democracy at the State Level?, 28 N.M.
L. REV. 227, 227 n.2 (1998). For California’s rules, see CAL. CONST. art. 18, §§ 3–4. Massachusetts allows voters to submit direct democracy initiatives to the state legislature for
approval. To reach the ballot, the initiative must be approved by fifty of the state’s two
hundred lawmakers in two consecutive sessions. MASS. CONST. art. 48, §§ 4–5.
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at 14–15 tbl.1.2.
Id.
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tional amendment rate of 0.36 amendments per year is the fifth low170
est of all states; Massachusetts’ rate of 0.55 is eighth lowest.
Vermont and Connecticut have low constitutional amendment
rates and impose particularly onerous requirements on lawmakers
171
who want to put constitutional amendments on the ballot.
Connecticut requires a three-fourths supermajority vote in each house in
one session or a majority vote in each of two sessions (with an inter172
vening election between the two sessions).
Vermont only allows
amendments to be introduced once every four years, requires that
amendments be passed in two consecutive legislative sessions, and requires a two-thirds supermajority vote in the state senate for passage
173
in the initial legislative session.
New Jersey and Hawaii also place
meaningful limits on constitutional amendment proposals. Hawaii
requires either a two-thirds supermajority vote in one session or a ma174
jority vote in two sessions.
New Jersey similarly requires a threefifths supermajority vote (of all members) in one session or a majority
175
vote in two sessions.
All in all, path-breaker states are among the
most politically insulated states in the nation.
In addition to override and retention risks, the ability of state supreme court justices to control their dockets impacts whether a state
court will play a path-breaker role. States without docket control, as
discussed in Part I, are more likely to take backlash risks into account.
On same-sex marriage, three path-breaking states (Vermont, New Jersey, Iowa) had no choice but to hear constitutional challenges to state
law; the other four had discretion (although each of those states
176
made use of somewhat different procedures).
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the two states (Vermont, New Jersey)
that took middle ground positions—finding for civil unions, not
same-sex marriage—were among the three states without docket con177
trol.

170

171
172
173
174
175
176
177

See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 248–49
(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
See id. Vermont has an amendment rate of 0.25 per year (second lowest); Connecticut’s
amendment rate of 0.96 is well below the 2.9 mean but is around the median of all states.
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 14, at 14–15 tbl.1.2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
In Iowa, state court justices risked electoral defeat by finding for same-sex marriage, not
civil union. For additional discussion, see supra notes 75 and 141.
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The specific features of state constitutional systems seem to have
played a key role in state supreme court decision making on same-sex
marriage. Politically insulated states are more willing to play a pathbreaking role and, in so doing, more likely to put the views of media
and academic elites ahead of the mass public. With that said, as one
of us has written elsewhere, elected officials and voters were more
supportive of extending marriage protections to same-sex couples in
178
path-breaking states than in most other states. Moreover, while we
think state experiences with same-sex marriage are instructive in understanding the nexus between democratic accountability and the
propensity of state supreme courts to either back or buck public opinion, we recognize that too much should not be read into a single
case study.
IV. CONCLUSION
State supreme court justices are subject to democratic checks unimaginable to federal court judges. Some of these checks cut in favor
of state court justices taking public opinion into account (either by
ruling in ways consistent with voter preferences or steering clear of
controversy by refusing to hear certain cases). The most notable of
these “pro-voter” checks are judicial elections and direct-democracy
initiatives. At the same time, public awareness of state supreme court
decision making is scant, and, consequently, there are relatively few
issues in which voters will punish justices for their decisions. More
than that, justices in the fourteen states with contested elections are
under increasing pressure to rule in ways that favor business interests,
especially campaign contributors, on low-salience economic issues
that matter to business constituencies but not voters.
The ways in which voters and business interests will impact state
justices is also tied to the unique structure of each state constitutional
system. In part, differences in retention schemes, docket control,
and the procedures to amend state law call attention to the potential
political vulnerability of justices (either to lose their seat outright or
to have their decision overturned by lawmakers or voters). Differences in state systems are also relevant because they speak to the types
of individuals who serve on state supreme courts. Justices who run in
contested races look and think more like politicians and personally
178

See Devins, supra note 1, at 1679–83 (discussing legislative action pertaining to marriage
protections for same-sex couples in California, Connecticut, Iowa, and New Jersey and
public support for judicially mandated same-sex marriage or civil unions in all pathbreaking states other than Vermont and Hawaii).

Dec. 2010]

PUBLIC OPINION AND STATE SUPREME COURTS

495

value the public validation that comes with electoral victory; justices
who are not subject to contentious reappointment or reelection battles look more like legal professionals and are more likely to value
their reputation among elites (bar groups, other judges, academics,
and the media).
Evidence on state supreme court decision making backs up these
claims, although the evidence is too limited to reach definitive conclusions. Studies on the role of public opinion in state supreme court
decision making have largely focused on criminal issues, especially
the death penalty. Studies on the role of business interests have been
limited to a handful of states and have not been systematic. In this
essay, we have supplemented existing studies on public opinion, but
only in a limited way. This essay, in other words, is but the first step,
and a cautious one at that, given the limited data. Considering both
the increasing national importance of state court decision making
and the increasing politicization and cost of state judicial elections,
the questions we address become all the more urgent. In the words
of Justice Kennedy, “We weren’t talking about this [thirty] years ago
because we didn’t have money in [judicial] elections. Money in elections presents us with a tremendous challenge, a tremendous prob179
lem, and we are remiss if we don’t at once address it and correct it.”
Further data and research are necessary to determine how state supreme courts—the courts of last resort for the states, and the functional courts of last resort ultimately for many—are influenced by
public opinion and campaign contributor interests.

179

Bill Moyers Journal, (PBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/02192010/transcript1.html (replaying a statement
made by Justice Kennedy during the original airing of the PBS program Frontline: Justice
for Sale on Nov. 23, 1999). An interesting statement in light of Kennedy’s recent deciding
vote in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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APPENDIX
State

Retention
Method

Issue

Public
Opinion

Case

Matches
Public
Opinion?

Hawaii

Gubernatorial Appointment/
Commission

Medical
Marijuana

May 2000—
60% support passage
of law making medical
marijuana
legal180

State v.
Mallan181

Yes

Feb. 2000—
77% favor
state legislature passing
law to allow
seriously ill
patients to
use marijuana for
medical
purposes if
approved by
medical
doctor
1998—63%
support use
of marijuana for medicinal purposes

180
181

Lynda Arakawa, Medical Marijuana Has Public Support, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, May 16,
2000, at 1A.
950 P.2d 178 (Haw. 1998) (holding that there is no fundamental right to possess and use
marijuana for recreational purposes and stating that the issue of medical marijuana was
not before the court).
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State

Retention
Method

Issue

Public
Opinion

Case

Matches
Public
Opinion?

Hawaii

Gubernatorial Appointment/
Commission

Gun
Control

State v.
Mendoza183

Yes

Maine

Gubernatorial Appointment/
Commission

Gun
Control

1999—six in
ten support
outright ban
on handguns, and
only one in
six support
an open
carry law182
2009—88%
favor background
checks at
gun shows184

Doe v.
Portland
Housing
Authority185

No

2006—47%
own gun in
household

182

183
184

185

Ken Kobayashi, Handgun Ban Has Majority Support, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Nov. 14,
1999, at 1A. Hawaii has strict gun laws, including registration, fingerprinting, and mandatory background checks. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-2 (2009) (stating the various requirements for obtaining a permit to acquire a firearm); see also Mary Simms, How Difficult
Is It to Buy a Gun in Hawaii?, HAWAII NEWS NOW, http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/
Global/story.asp?S=6385267 (describing the various steps needed for the purchase of a
firearm, including taking a training test and waiting for a background check).
920 P.2d 357 (Haw. 1996) (holding that the firearm permit law in question does not violate the right to bear arms under the Hawaii Constitution).
Kevin Miller, The Legal Landscape: Gun Control Bills in Maine Face Tough Challenges,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Me.), Nov. 19, 2009, at A1. In 1987, Maine amended its constitution to make it more favorable to gun ownership. Id. The constitution previously stated
that citizens had the right “to keep and bear arms for the common defense.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In amended form, the constitution now provides that
“every citizen has a right to keep and bear arms and this right shall never be questioned.”
ME. CONST. art. I, § 16.
656 A.2d 1200, 1202 (Me. 1995) (holing that state law prohibited municipalities from
enacting stricter gun control laws than the state).
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State

Retention
Method

Issue

Public
Opinion

Case

Matches
Public
Opinion?

New
York

Gubernatorial Appointment /
Commission

Gun
Control

2000—72%
say controlling gun
ownership is
more important than
upholding
the right to
bear arms186
2004—61%
backed additional
funding of
$5.6 billion
for education

Hamilton
v. Berretta
U.S.A.
Corp.187

No

New
York

Gubernatorial
Appointment /
Commission

Education

2001—60%
say state
spending on
New York
City schools
should be
increased

186
187

188
189

190

People v.
Brown188

Campaign
for Fiscal
Equity v.
State189

Yes

Campaign
for Fiscal
Equity v.
State
(2006)190

Gore Has Big Lead in New York Presidential Race, QUINNIPIAC U. (Apr. 6, 2000),
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1318.xml?ReleaseID=606.
750 N.E.2d 1055, 1059, 1061–62 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that handgun manufacturers do
not owe a duty to exercise reasonable care in their marketing and distributing to people
injured by their illegally obtained handguns).
788 N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (N.Y. 2003) (discussing first and second degree criminal sale of a
firearm statute).
801 N.E.2d 326, 343, 348 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that state failed to fulfill the constitutional
mandate to provide sound, basic education and directing state to implement reform in
13-year lawsuit over whether under-funded schools violated state constitution).
861 N.E.2d 50, 58–59 (N.Y. 2006) (upholding the allocation of money issued for the reforms).
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State

Retention
Method

Issue

Public
Opinion

Case

Matches
Public
Opinion?

New Jersey

Gubernatorial to age
seventy

Gun
Control

State v.
Smith192

Yes

New Jersey

Gubernatorial to age
seventy

Education

1999—71%
say controlling guns
more important than
protecting
gun owners’
rights, and
52% support complete ban on
handgun
sales191
1998—52%
support
greater
funding of
poor school
districts,
and 41%
support
vouchers193

Abbot v.
Burke194

Yes

191
192
193
194

Parents Should Be Told of Girl’s Abortion, QUINNIPIAC U. (June 10, 1999),
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1299.xml?ReleaseID=699.
963 A.2d 281, 289 (N.J. 2009) (holding that prosecutors need not prove a criminal knowingly possessed a defaced gun as long as gun was actually defaced).
New Jersey Voters Want Limits on Abortion, QUINNIPIAC U. (Mar. 5, 1998),
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1299.xml?ReleaseID=761.
710 A.2d 450, 474 (N.J. 1998) (holding that school funding plan was unconstitutional as
applied to special needs districts because it failed to satisfy the thorough and efficient
education clause of the New Jersey Constitution and ordering remedial relief).
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State

Retention
Method

Issue

Public
Opinion

Case

Matches
Public
Opinion?

New Jersey

Gubernatorial to age
seventy

Abortion—
parental
notice
law

Gubernatorial to age
seventy

Education

Planned
Parenthood of
Central
New Jersey
v. Farmer196
Claremont
School District v.
Governor
(2002)198

No

New
Hampshire

73% of voters support
parental notice before
minors can
have abortion195
2001—45%
said education funding
most important issue
2008—10%
said education funding
was most
important
issue 197

Claremont
School District v.
Governor
(1997)199

195
196
197

198

199

Yes

New Jersey Voters Split on Abortion Limits, QUINNIPIAC U. (Dec. 7, 2000),
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1299.xml?ReleaseID=587.
762 A.2d 620, 621 (N.J. 2000) (holding the Parental Notice for Abortion Act as unconstitutional under equal protection principles).
Andrew E. Smith, WMUR/Granite State Poll, U.N.H. SURVEY CENTER, 6 (Sept. 25 2008),
available
at
http://www.unh.edu/survey-center/news/pdf/gsp2008_fall_govapp
92508.pdf.
794 A.2d 744, 759 (N.H. 2002) (reasoning that existing scheme to finance education had
deficiencies that were inconsistent with the state’s constitutional duty to provide adequate
education).
703 A.2d 1353, 1360 (N.H. 1997) (holding that the system for financing schools was disproportionate and unreasonable within the meaning of the constitutional provision requiring proportional and reasonable tax assessment, and that state-funded, constitutionally adequate public elementary and secondary education is a fundamental right).
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State

Retention
Method

Issue

Public
Opinion

Case

Matches
Public
Opinion?

Rhode
Island

Gubernatorial/ Life
Tenure

Gun
Control

Mosby v.
Devine201

Yes

Rhode
Island

Gubernatorial/ Life
Tenure

Education

Gun ownership in state
mongst lowest in nation
at 13.3 %200
2001—
general assembly
should increase state
funding for
public
schools by a
lot, 49%, a
little, 29%,
not at all,
8%, don’t
know,
14%202

City of
Pawtucket
v. Sundlun203

No

200

201

202
203

Press Release, Violence Pol’y Ctr., States with Higher Gun Ownership and Weak Gun
Laws Lead Nation in Gun Death (May 6, 2009), http://www.vpc.org/press/0905
gundeath.htm.
851 A.2d 1031, 1039–40, 1044, 1051 (R.I. 2004) (holding that the state constitutional
right to bear arms, though military in context, extends to individuals, but the legislature
has the ability to reasonably regulate that right by not granting a hearing for a denial of a
firearm license).
Providence Residents Say Public Schools Are Moving in Right Direction, BROWN U. NEWS SERV.
(Feb. 13, 2001), www.brown.edu/Departments/Taubman_Center/polls/00-080.html.
662 A.2d 40, 42, 55 (R.I. 1995) (holding that the state method of school funding was constitutional and did not violate the education clause or equal protection provision of the
state constitution, and that the education clause did not confer a right or guarantee of
receiving an “equal, adequate and meaningful education”).

502

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:2

State

Retention
Method

Issue

Public
Opinion

Case

Matches
Public
Opinion?

Alabama

Partisan

Gay
Marriage

2005—54%
strongly
support
amendment
to prohibit
gay marriage204
2004—50%
of Georgia
voters oppose any
form of recognition for
homosexual
couples207
1998—
Medical Marijuana approved by
voter initiative

Ex parte
H.H.205

Yes

Georgia

NonPartisan

SameSex
Marriage

Washington

NonPartisan

Medical
Marijuana

204

205

206

207
208
209

Ex parte
J.M.F.206

Perdue v.
208
Kelly

Yes

State v.
Fry209

No

Press Release, Ctr. for Governmental Servs. at Auburn Univ., Attitudes About Same-sex
Marriage Amendment, (Feb. 9, 2005), http://www.askalabama.org/press_releases/
february2005/Logo%20Study%20Vol%202%20No%201%20Marriage%20Amendment
%20Winter%202005.pdf.
830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring specially) (“[H]omosexual conduct of a parent . . . creates a strong presumption of unfitness. . . . Alabama expressly
does not recognize same-sex marriages or domestic partnerships. Homosexual conduct
is . . . a violation of the laws of nature and of nature’s God . . . .”).
730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (stating that homosexual relationships are “neither
legal in this state, nor moral in the eyes of most of its citizens.” (quoting Ex parte D.W.W.,
717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Exit Poll: Few Georgia Voters Support Gay Marriage, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 3, 2004, available
at http://new.accessnorthga.com/detail.php?n=175090&c=2.
632 S.E. 2d 110 (Ga. 2006) (reinstating voter-approved ban on gay marriage previously
struck down by county court).
228 P.3d 1, 7–8 (Wash. 2010) (“[A]n authorized user of medical marijuana will have an
affirmative defense only if he or she shows full compliance with the Act. However, an affirmative defense does not negate probable cause for a search in the case, conducted with
a valid warrant. . . . [The defendant] could not avail himself of the compassionate use defense because his claimed health conditions did not qualify under the Act.”).

Dec. 2010]

PUBLIC OPINION AND STATE SUPREME COURTS

503

State

Retention
Method

Issue

Public
Opinion

Case

Matches
Public
Opinion?

Ohio

NonPartisan

Eminent
Domain

Norwood
v. Horney211

Yes

Oregon

NonPartisan

Samesex Marriage

2007—82%
of voters
oppose using eminent
domain to
take property for economic development,
and 50% say
government
has abused
eminent
domain in
the past210
2004—state
constitutional
amendment
banning
same-sex
marriage
passed with
57% support

In 2005,
the Oregon Supreme
Court
nullified
3,000
same-sex
marriages212

Yes

210
211

212

Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ., Ohio Gov’s Approval up as Voters Get to Know Him
(Mar. 21, 2007), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1322.xml?ReleaseId=1028&ss=print.
853 N.E.2d 1115, 1145–46 (Ohio 2006) (holding that economic or financial benefit alone
is insufficient to satisfy the public use requirement of the takings clause in Ohio’s state
constitution).
Almanac, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 2009, at 19.
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Wisconsin

NonPartisan

Samesex Marriage

2006—
39.4% approve of gay
marriage,
58.7% approve of civil unions213

In 2009,
the Wisconsin
Supreme
Court
held domestic
partner
registry
does not
violate
the state
constitutional
amendment
banning
gay marriage214

Yes

213

214

Press Release, Univ. of Wis. Survey Ctr., Badger Poll No. 22, Release No. 3: Same-sex
Marriage, Unions, and Referendum (July 17, 2006), http://www.uwsc.wisc.edu/BP22
PressRelease_Death_Samesex.pdf.
Arthur Zettel, Letter to the Editor, Gays Pushing Their Beliefs on Everyone, THE SHEBOYGAN
PRESS (Sheboygan, Wis.), Nov. 20, 2009, at A05.
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California

Merit Plan

Medical
Marijuana215

2004—74%
supported
legalizing
marijuana
for medical
use under a
doctor’s supervision

People v.
Kelly217

Yes

1996—56%
supported
legalized
marijuana
for medical
use under
doctor supervision216

215

216

217

This came up as a voter-initiated ballot measure in 1996 and passed 56% to 44%. The
Field Poll’s Record in Measuring Statewide Ballot Propositions in California (1994–Present),
FIELD POLL, http://www.field.com/fieldpoll/propositions.html (last visited Nov. 14,
2010).
See Press Release, The Field Poll, Strong Support for Implementation of Prop. 215, the
State’s Medical Marijuana Law (Jan. 30, 2004), http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/
subscribers/Rls2105.pdf.
222 P.3d 186, 209–11 (Cal. 2010) (striking down law placing limits on the amount of
medical marijuana a patient may legally possess and stating that only voters can change
amendments added to the state constitution through the initiative process); see also Thadeus Greenson, State Court Ruling Shoots Down Medical Marijuana Restrictions, TIMES
STANDARD (Eureka, Cal.), Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.times-standard.com/ci_14245511.
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Arizona

Merit Plan

Indian
Gaming

Salt River
PimaMaricopa
Indian
Cmty v.
Hull219

Yes

Arizona

Merit Plan

Samesex Marriage

1999—69%
favor reservation casinos in the
state and
75% favor
renewal of
Indian gaming compacts218
2004—60%
opposed allowing
same-sex
couples to
marry; 49%
opposed to
the state recognizing a
same-sex
marriage
that is performed in
another
state220

In 2004,
the Arizona Supreme
Court refused to
hear a
case challenging
the denial of a gay
couple’s
application for a
marriage
license221

Yes

Alaska

Merit Plan

Abor-

State v.

No

218
219
220

221

2005—80%

Betty Beard, Indian Gaming Support Strong in State, Survey Says, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 30,
1999, at 5B.
945 P.2d 818, 826 (Ariz. 1997) (resolving dispute over gaming contract in favor of tribe).
Recent State Polls on Same-Sex Marriage & Civil Unions, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, 2
(May 6, 2005), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/May2005
StatePolls.pdf.
Michael Kiefer, Same-Sex Marriage Ban Intact in Arizona; High Court Refuses to Consider Appeal, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 26, 2004, at 1A.
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tion—
Parental
Consent

support
abortion parental consent law222
2006—37%
agree, 52%
disagree,
and 12%
not sure
that giving
vouchers to
students in
poorly performing
schools so
they can attend private
schools is a
good use of
public education
funds224

Planned
Parenthood of
Alaska223
Bush v.
Holmes225

2009—

Varnum v.

Florida

Merit Plan

Education

Iowa

Merit Plan

Same-

222
223
224
225

507

Matches
Public
Opinion?

Yes

No

Lieutenant Governor Loren Leman Called on Alaska Supreme Court to End an Eight-Year Delay in
Implementing Law To Protect Parental Rights, supra note 137.
171 P.3d 577, 585 (Alaska 2007) (holding parental consent law unconstitutional).
Catherine Dolinski & William March, Poll Shows Education Is Concern Locally, TAMPA TRIB.,
May 31, 2006, at 1.
919 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2006) (vouchers that allowed students at failing public schools
to attend private schools held unconstitutional).
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sex MarMarriage

30.4% favored ruling
that would
allow samesex marriage226
2007—72 %
favor stricter
immigration
laws

Brien227

Immigration

2008—82%
oppose
granting
drivers’ licenses to
illegal
aliens228
Pennsylvania

226

227
228
229
230

231

Merit Plan

Samesex Marriage

2004—63%
oppose
same-sex
marriage,
50% oppose
civil unions230

[Vol. 13:2

Matches
Public
Opinion?

Reinforced
Earth Co.
v. Workers’
Compensation Appeal
Board229

No

T.B. v.
L.R.M.231

No

Devlin v.
City of
Philadelphia232

Jason Hancock, Same-Sex Marriage Opponents Face Uphill Fight in Iowa, IOWA INDEP., Apr. 3,
2009,
http://iowaindependent.com/13558/same-sex-marriage-opponents-face-uphillfight-in-iowa.
763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (declaring unconstitutional a state statute limiting marriage to a man and a woman).
Pennsylvania, supra note 143 (reporting polls).
810 A.2d 99, 106 (Pa. 2002) (holding that illegal aliens are eligible for workers’ compensation).
Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ., Leave Gay Marriage to States, Not U.S. Constitution,
Pennsylvania Voters Tell Quinnipiac University Poll; But Voters Oppose Gay Marriage 2-1
(Mar. 18, 2004), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1327.xml?ReleaseID=300&ss=print.
786 A.2d 913, 918–19 (Pa. 2001) (stating that the nature of the relationship between a
mother and her girlfriend was irrelevant to whether the girlfriend stood in loco parentis to
child and holding that girlfriend had standing to seek partial custody of child under doctrine of in loco parentis).
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Tennessee

Merit Plan

Education

Tennessee
Small
School Systems v.
McWherter234

Yes

Maryland

Merit Plan

Abortion

1992—
73.2%
agreed with
lower court
ruling to
equalize
school funding233
1992—62%
of voters
approved
referendum
that liberalized Maryland’s abortion laws235

Kelly v.
Vote Know
Coalition
of Maryland236

Yes

232

233
234

235
236

862 A.2d 1234, 1243 (Pa. 2004) (upholding city’s extension of employment benefits to
life partners and stating that even though city had designated a life partnership as a marital status, the city had not legislated in the area of marriage).
Univ. of Tenn. Soc. Sci. Research Inst., Tennessee Poll (Mar. 2, 1992) (unpublished survey) (on file with author).
851 S.W.2d 139, 140–41 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that the state constitution requires free
public schools that afford substantially equal educational opportunities to all students
and finding that that state school funding program violated equal protection).
Todd Spangler, Abortion Measure Decisive Winner, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at B1.
626 A.2d 959, 966 (Md. 1993) (rejecting anti-abortion group challenge to referendum).

